

Research Report:
The Situation of the Hazaras in the Fourth Year of Taliban Rule
(August 15, 2024 – August 15, 2025)



Bolaq Analysts Network

Research Report

The Situation of the Hazaras in the Fourth Year of Taliban Rule

(August 15, 2024 – August 15, 2025)

August 15, 2025

The intellectual property rights of this document belong to Bolaq Analysts Network and its contributors.

Acknowledgments

Bolaq Analysts Network extends its sincere gratitude to the research team members who worked both inside and outside Afghanistan to complete this comprehensive study.

As an independent, non-profit organization committed to justice, peace, and equality in a neutral manner, Bolaq Analysts Network strives to shed light on the realities of the situation in Afghanistan through in-depth research. By sharing these findings with both the people of Afghanistan and the international community, we aim to help pave the way toward justice.

We express our heartfelt thanks to the research team members—Taiba Jafari, Ali Ahmadi, A.H. Awareh (pseudonym, team member in Afghanistan), Mastora Shafahi, Ali Mohibi, Selene Azad (pseudonym, team member in Afghanistan), Habib Paiman, and Asif Yousufi—for their tireless efforts in collecting data through interviews, surveys and questionnaires, and for preparing and distributing questionnaires, and analyzing the results. Our special appreciation also goes to the translation team—Akram Gizabi, Reza Javid, Mohammad Jawad Ali Aqa, Dawood Wasl, and Qasim Loman—for translating this report from Persian to English. Lastly, thank you to Anis Rezaie for editing the report.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge the Hazara people who, despite challenging circumstances, generously provided information and participated in interviews. This research is respectfully and proudly dedicated to the Hazara people, who, in the face of continued oppression, remain steadfast in defending their survival, dignity, and human rights.

Summary and Key Findings

Four years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan have brought grave security, social, and economic challenges for the Hazara community. Life under Taliban dominance has become an unending nightmare for the Hazaras. The security situation in Hazara-inhabited areas has sharply deteriorated, with their lands being seized by the Taliban and Kochi nomads, who receive active support from the regime. Many Hazaras have been forcibly displaced from their ancestral homes. Hazara women and girls have been arbitrarily detained, imprisoned, and disappeared without any legal justification.

Socially and economically, the Hazaras face severe hardships. Many have been dismissed from government positions, and their livelihoods have been drastically undermined.

This study examines the security, social, and economic conditions of the Hazara community in the fourth year of Taliban rule (August 15, 2024 – August 15, 2025). The research employed a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data, gathered through interviews with 25 individuals—including two security experts—and an analysis of questionnaires completed by a sample of 355 Hazaras residing inside Afghanistan.

Security Situation of the Hazaras:

- 48.5% of respondents believe that the security situation in Hazara areas has worsened over the past year.
- 19 Hazaras were killed by the Taliban or Kochis supported by the Taliban, between August 2024 and August 2025.
- In the provinces of Behsud, Ghazni, and Bamyān, Hazara lands have been seized by the Taliban and Kochi nomads, forcing many families into displacement.
- The Taliban, through the establishment of a so-called *Judicial Commission*, have validated land ownership documents for Kochis over properties seized from Hazaras, without any legal basis.

Social Situation of the Hazaras:

- 85.6% reported an increase in cultural and religious discrimination, as well as psychological insecurity, in Hazara areas due to the appointment of Taliban members to local government offices.

- 51.3% reported a decline in access to healthcare services over the past year.
- 83.4% stated that girls in their families have been deprived of educational and employment opportunities in the past year.
- 40.8% reported an increase in the forced marriage of girls under Taliban rule.
- 76.9% of Hazaras are considering migration in search of a safe place to live.

Economic Situation of the Hazaras:

- 52.1% described their family's economic status as "very poor," 30.1% as "poor," and only 2.3% as "good."
- 60.8% of Hazaras have been dismissed from government jobs due to their ethnicity.
- 67.3% stated that the appointment of Taliban forces to government departments has resulted in an increase in illegal taxation.
- Economic projects in Hazara areas are distributed unfairly.

Table of Contents

3. Chapter 1: Introduction	1
3.1 Aim	3
3.2 Research Question	3
3.3 Methodology	4
3.4 Statistical Population and Sample Size	5
3.5 Challenges and Limitations	7
3.6 Demographics of the Study	9
4. Chapter 2: Security Situation	11
4.1 Terrorist Incidents	15
4.2 Land Seizures and Forced Displacement	17
4.3 Forced Displacement of Rashak Village Residents, Bamiyan	22
4.4 Patterns of Land Grabbing	24
4.5 Taliban Bullying and Extortion in Hazara Areas	26
4.6 Tourism and Government Contracts	30
4.7 Community Testimonies of Taliban Pressure, Discrimination, and Security Threats	31
4.8 Indirect Bullying Through Support of Other Groups	32
5. Chapter 3: Social Situation	35
5.1 The Status of Women: Denial of Education, Higher Education, and Employment	36
5.2 Forced and Child Marriage	39
5.3 Extrajudicial Detention and Disappearance of Hazara Females by the Taliban	41
5.4 Migratory Crisis and Forced Deportation from Neighboring Countries	45
5.5 Forced Deportation from Iran	47
6. Chapter 4: Economic Situation	50
6.1 Livelihood Crisis of the Hazaras under Taliban Rule	50
6.2 Ethnic Discrimination and Economic Deprivation	52
6.3 Agriculture and Husbandry	54
6.4 Tourism and Urban Areas	61

7. Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations	62
7.1 Security Sector	62
7.2 Social Sector	63
7.3 Economic Sector	63
8. Appendices	64
9. References	68

Chapter one: Introduction

On August 15, 2021, Afghanistan's two-decade-long presidential era came to an end, and for the second time, the country fell into the hands of the Taliban. Under Taliban rule, life has become increasingly burdensome for millions of Afghanistan's citizens, setting a turbulent and violent course for much of the population. Widespread human rights violations, executions, forced displacement and migration, land grabbing, loss of life and property, summary trials, sexual violence against women and girls, the closure of schools and universities to females, the ban on girls' education, and the imposition of exorbitant and arbitrary taxes have become the defining features of Afghanistan under Taliban control.

According to assessments by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA), in 2025, 22.9 million people in Afghanistan need humanitarian assistance, including 5.7 million women and 5 million men facing severe vulnerability.^{1 2} Findings from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also indicate that in 2024, three-quarters of households (75%) in the country experienced food insecurity, marking a 6% increase compared to 2023. According to UN findings, the situation in Afghanistan remains highly unstable and continues to be affected by the decline in humanitarian aid levels.^{3 4}

In addition to the reduction in humanitarian aid over the past year, the increase in the return of migrants and deportees—particularly through forced repatriation from neighboring countries, especially Iran and Pakistan—has exacerbated the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. This crisis has taken on more complex dimensions when examined in relation to vulnerable groups, especially the Hazara community. For instance, our investigations into the deportation process in Iran show that Hazaras, due to their distinct physical features, have been more easily identifiable than others. As a result, over the past year, they have been disproportionately subjected to arrest, harassment, and anti-migrant hostility in that country.

¹ . United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2025, March).

² . *Afghanistan: Humanitarian update, March 2025*. United Nations. Retrieved July 28, 2025, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-march-2025>

³ . United Nations Development Program

⁴ . United Nations Development Programme. (2025, April). *Afghanistan socio-economic review: Fragile gains, deepening subsistence insecurity, 2023–2024* (p. 50).

The Hazara community and other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan experience significantly harsher living conditions compared to others and face far more severe restrictions. This reality has been well documented in reports by international organizations. For example, Richard Bennett, the United Nations Special Rapporteur about human rights in Afghanistan, noted in a report presented at the 59th session of the UN Human Rights Council that all decisions in the country are now based solely on the Taliban's interpretation of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. As a result, the Hazaras and Shias are subject to rulings that may conflict with their own religious principles. According to the report, Hazara women who had previously obtained divorces under Shia Ja'fari jurisprudence have now had their divorces invalidated by the Taliban.⁵

These cases illustrate how vulnerable groups—particularly the Hazaras—are profoundly affected by the Taliban's policies and actions on multiple levels. They are forced to comply with commands that have no religious relevance to their beliefs and convictions and compelled to submit to customs and practices that bear no cultural connection to them. Consequently, since the arrival of the Taliban, the psychological security of vulnerable groups—especially the Hazaras—has significantly deteriorated. According to a study conducted in Bamiyan province, following the Taliban's restrictions on schoolgirls there, many of these girls have reported having contemplated suicide at least once.⁶

Given this situation, it is clear that the vulnerability of the Hazara people has increased significantly. In response, the Bolaq Analysts Network (BAN) has committed to producing a detailed and investigative report on the condition of this community annually. Now, as the fourth year of Taliban rule comes to a close, the BAN research team—building on its previous studies and investigations into the Hazaras and their human rights situation—has conducted a new assessment of their circumstances during this period of governance.

⁵ . United Nations Human Rights Council. (2025). *Access to justice and protection for women and girls and the impact of multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination* (A/HRC/59/25). United Nations. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5925-access-justice-and-protection-women-and-girls-and-impact>

⁶ . Ahmadi, & Jafari. (2025). *Psychological impact of Taliban's religious police on female students in Bamiyan City: A study from 2021–2024* (p. 10). Bolaq Analysts Network. <http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26803.13607>

1.1 Aim

The primary aim of this research is to examine the situation of the Hazara community during the fourth year of Taliban rule. In pursuit of this objective, the study closely investigates the economic, social, and security conditions of the Hazaras, with a particular focus on identifying the most vulnerable groups within the community. Additionally, this research seeks to objectively present the experiences of those Hazara individuals most severely affected by the Taliban's actions, as well as other victims of the regime who have received limited attention in previous studies and media coverage.

This impartial and objective research aims to inform human rights organizations about the plight of the Hazaras under Taliban rule. Moreover, the report serves as a reliable and unbiased resource for international advocacy efforts, supporting the Hazara people's pursuit of justice.

1.2 Research questions

A) Main question:

How have the security, social and economic situations of Hazaras been during the four years of Taliban rule?

B) Sub-questions

1. To what extent have the Hazaras been exposed to security threats such as targeted attacks, discrimination in dealings with security institutions, and general insecurity?
2. How have the Taliban's restrictions on education, personal freedom and women's rights affected the Hazaras?
3. To what extent have land confiscation, forced displacement, and social discrimination been experienced by Hazaras?
4. How extensively have the Hazaras' experienced forced emigration from Afghanistan and forced repatriation back to Afghanistan from neighboring countries?
5. How has the situation concerning employment, income and access to financial means been among Hazaras during the past year?

1.3 Research Methodology

This research employed a triangulation method (mixed-method approach), combining both quantitative and qualitative data collection to gain a deeper understanding of the situation of the Hazara community. Primary data was gathered through questionnaires and interviews with members of the Hazara community, while secondary data was drawn from existing studies conducted by other human rights organizations.

The questionnaire consisted of 22 questions in the following categories:

- 4 questions related to the respondent's personal background,
- 5 questions regarding the security situation,
- 8 questions concerning the social situation, and
- 5 questions about the economic situation.

Among these:

A total of 11 Likert scale questions were designed, enabling respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement using five options: *strongly agree*, *agree*, *somewhat agree*, *disagree*, and *strongly disagree*. Additionally, 9 multiple-choice questions allowed respondents to select from predefined options, while 2 open-ended questions invited participants to share personal experiences or provide information on security threats, Taliban pressure, land grabbing, and discriminatory practices in their area.

The questionnaires were designed and administered online. In the initial phase, they were distributed to the target group via WhatsApp using a convenience sampling method. Subsequently, a snowball sampling approach was employed, whereby participants were asked to share the questionnaires with friends and acquaintances who met the study criteria—namely, being of Hazara ethnicity and residing in Afghanistan. This combination of sampling methods expanded the reach of the survey while safeguarding participant confidentiality and ensuring the security of their information.

To ensure content validity, the questionnaires were reviewed by two experts prior to distribution, and their feedback was incorporated into the final version. Face validity was assessed through a pilot test with 25 participants at the outset of the research. This test evaluated the clarity of

the questions, the comprehensibility of the response options, and identified any potential issues in the questionnaire design.

In the qualitative component of the research, two security experts were interviewed regarding the overall security situation of the Hazara community under Taliban rule. Furthermore, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. The questions were tailored to each participant's lived experiences, which could include incidents of violence, forced displacement, unusual taxation, or land disputes with the Kuchis. Each respondent was asked only about experiences directly relevant to them, ensuring that data collection followed a focused thematic framework.

Thematic analysis was not fully utilized due to some limitations in this research. On investigating sensitive issues such as land grabbing, it was not possible to access larger sample size due to fear and insecurity induced by the Taliban's pressure and suppression. In light of these restrictions and considerations for the security and safety of participants, in some sections of this research, the number of interviewees remained very limited.

The study uses a descriptive method to analyze and synthesis data. Direct quotations are used to highlight the severity of the situation of the participants on sensitive topics. Quantitative data is also analyzed using descriptive indicators including frequency, percentage, and mean.

1.4 Statistical Population and Sample Size

The statistical population of this research includes all Hazaras living inside Afghanistan. According to the CIA estimate in the year 2000 AD, Hazaras made up 19% of Afghanistan's population.⁷ There has not been any census over decades, so the percentages are estimates and probably have changed little during the past two decades as demographic changes have been similar throughout the country. Since the total population of Afghanistan, according to the official estimate of Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organization (CSO) in the year 1403 Hijri

⁷ CIA. (2000). *The World Factbook 2000 — Afghanistan*. Central Intelligence Agency.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/2000/afghanistan.html>

Shamsi (corresponding to 2024 AD), is approximately estimated at 35.7 million people, the statistical population of this research reaches 6,783,000 Hazaras residing in Afghanistan.⁸

To determine the sample size, Cochran's formula for a finite population was used. In this formula, considering a 95% confidence level with a normal z-value of 1.96, a margin of error of 5% (d = 0.05), a conservative proportion of 50% (p = 0.5) and (q = 0.5), the required sample size of 384 people was calculated as follows.


In this calculation, N represents the population of Hazras residing in Afghanistan.

$$n = \frac{\frac{z^2 pq}{d^2}}{1 + \frac{1}{N} \left[\frac{z^2 pq}{d^2} - 1 \right]} = \frac{\frac{1.96^2 * 0.5 * 0.5}{0.05^2}}{1 + \frac{1}{6783000} \left[\frac{1.96^2 * 0.5 * 0.5}{0.05^2} - 1 \right]} = \frac{\frac{0.9604}{0.0025}}{1 + \frac{383.16}{6783000}} = \frac{384.16}{1 + 0.0000565} \approx 384$$

In this study, 412 questionnaires were distributed among 295 men and 117 women, and we managed to collect 361 questionnaires. Among the questionnaires collected, 355 were considered valid. The number of valid questionnaires is very close to the standard sample size obtained in this study. Therefore, with a margin of error of 5.2%, it is acceptable within scientific criteria in social science studies. The number of interviewees in this study is also 25 people.

⁸ NSIA. (2024). *Estimated population of Afghanistan 2024–25* (p. II). National Statistics and Information Authority. <https://nsia.gov.af:8443/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B3-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-1403.pdf>

Map 1: Data Collection Site (provinces in blue correspond to sites where respondents live)



1.5 Challenges and Limitations

Conducting this research posed numerous challenges, with the security and safety of both researchers and participants being the most significant. These constraints made the use of random (probability) sampling impossible, resulting in exclusive reliance on non-probability sampling methods. Consequently, the questionnaires do not represent the views of the entire Hazara population in Afghanistan.

For security reasons, most interviewees declined to have their interviews recorded. As a result, researchers collected data through detailed note-taking during conversations with participants—many of whom were victims of Taliban violence. The pervasive atmosphere of fear and terror, explicitly expressed by participants, necessitated withholding detailed personal information about them in this study. In cases involving land confiscation and forced

displacement, some interviewees provided relevant documents; however, most refused to disclose these materials due to the imminent threat to their safety.

Furthermore, due to security warnings, the distribution and collection of questionnaires were limited to a tight timeframe of just 10 days. Throughout this period, there was concern that the questionnaires might be accessed by individuals outside the target group, potentially compromising the validity of the responses. To mitigate this risk, the online questionnaires were collected as quickly as possible, and the resulting sample size was deemed sufficient for the study's purposes.

It is important to highlight that most of the questionnaire respondents — which do not include the interviewees — live in provincial centers and cities. Therefore, their opinions do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hazaras living in the villages. Additionally, respondents were of different educational backgrounds. While 98.9% of the respondents are educated and trained individuals, only 4 respondents are illiterate. Meanwhile, according to UNESCO data, the literacy rate in Afghanistan in 2022 was reported as 37.3% (22.6% for women and 52.1% for men).⁹ Therefore, the results obtained from the questionnaires are mostly representative of views shared by the literate segment of the Hazara community. They cannot reflect the perspectives of illiterate members of the Hazara community.

Lastly, the study faced significant limitations related to the imbalance of gender representation and geographic distribution among participants. Only 73 respondents (20.6%) were women, accounting for roughly one-fifth of the total, which reflects a substantial gender disparity. Moreover, from the provinces of Kandahar, Badakhshan, Sar-e Pul, Uruzgan, and Kapisa, only one participant from each province responded to the questionnaire.

Although the Hazara populations in these provinces are relatively small, a higher response rate was anticipated. Additionally, none of the respondents from these provinces were women, further limiting the study's ability to capture the perspectives of Hazara women residing there. These two limitations pose a significant challenge to adequately reflecting the views of the Hazara community in these regions.

⁹ UNESCO. (n.d.). *Community-based literacy and complementary learning possibilities*. UNESCO Kabul Field Office. <https://www.unesco.org/en/fieldoffice/kabul/expertise/education/literacy-learning-possibilities>

To address gender imbalance, efforts were made to achieve a greater or at least equal number of female respondents compared to males in provinces such as Kabul, Bamyan, Daikundi, and Ghazni, where women showed more interest in participating. Despite these measures, gender disparity remained a persistent challenge throughout the research.

1.6 Demographics of the Study

In this study, 355 people responded to the questionnaire. Among them, 276 respondents (77.7%) were men, and 73 respondents (20.6%) were women. Six respondents (1.7%) did not disclose their gender. Interviews were conducted with 25 participants—19 participants (76%), were men, and 6 participants (24%) were women.

Regarding education level, 207 participants (58.3%) were university educated holding bachelor's degrees, while 65 participants (18.3%) held master's and doctorate degrees. Seventy-nine participants (22.3%) had completed school and only 4 participants (1.1%) were illiterate. The interviewees were mostly local residents with primary education level.

Respondents to the questionnaires were categorized into five age groups. Among them, 188 respondents (53%) were aged between 26-35 years, eighty-six respondents (24.2%) were aged between 18-25 years, sixty-eight respondents (19.2%) were aged between 36-50 years, 9 respondents (2.5%) were under 18 years old, and 4 respondents (1.1%) were over the age of 50.

Among the interviewees, 8 were in the age group of 18-25 years, 16 in the age group 26-35 years, 31 in the age group 36-50 years, and 47 were over 50 years old

Table 1 shows detailed demographics of the study

	Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Gender profile	Men	276	77.7%
	Women	73	20.6%
	Did not answer	6	1.7%
	Total	n = 355	100%
Age profile	<18 years	9	2.53%
	18-25	86	24.2%
	26-35	188	53%
	36-50	68	19.2%
	>50 years	4	1.1%
	Total	n = 355	100%
Education level	Illiterate	4	1.1%
	Primary school	79	22.3%
	Bachelor's degree	207	58.3%
	Master's degree or doctorate	65	18.3%
	Total	n = 355	100%
Province of residence	Kabul	110	31%
	Bamyan	68	19.1%
	Daikundi	39	10.98%
	Ghazni	74	20.8%
	Balkh	20	5.6%
	Herat	14	3.9%
	Maidan Wardak	11	3.1%
	Parwan	5	1.4%
	Kapisa	1	0.28%
	Sar-e Pul	1	0.28%
	Badakhshan	1	0.28%
	Kandahar	1	0.28%
	Oruzgan	1	0.28%
	Ghor	4	1.12%
	Did not answer	5	1.4%
	Total	n = 355	100%

Chapter Two: Security Situation

The Hazaras, as one of Afghanistan's ethnic groups and religious minorities, have been systematically subjected to violent attacks and genocide throughout history. Predictive data from the Australian National University's 2024–2026 Atrocity Forecast ranks Afghanistan at the top of 15 countries at highest risk of genocide and political mass killing.¹⁰ Prior to the Taliban's rule, Afghanistan was ranked 10th on this list. Since the Taliban's rise to power, attacks on the Hazaras have continued. In addition to these attacks, Hazaras experience other forms of insecurity such as land confiscation and forced displacement from their homes. In most of these cases, the Taliban only offer Hazaras a couple of days to vacate their houses so that Taliban can hand them over to their members and loyalists.¹¹

In an interview with the Bolaq Analysts Network, a security expert provided the following assessment of the general security situation of the Hazaras under the Taliban rule over the past year:

The security situation of the Hazaras has continuously deteriorated since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan (the past four years) and has now reached a critical and organized stage. The Taliban and their allied groups, using intelligence infiltration tools, have managed to establish spy, diversionary, and control networks within the Hazara community. These individuals and groups have either been financially bribed, threatened, or deceived. Through these networks, the Taliban have imposed extensive restrictions on the Hazara community—from confiscating historical lands to exerting ethnic and religious pressures in hospitals, schools, courts, and other state institutions. In many cases, Hazara lands have been forcibly given to Kuchi nomads or migrant Pashtuns, and in cases of resistance, people have been subjected to physical violence.

In state-run health institutions, including Jinnah Hospital, the 50-bed Hospital, and the 100-bed Tank-e-Tel Hospital, all in Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul, the Hazara patients are turned away and referred to private hospitals, whereas Pashtun patients from provinces such as Logar, Maidan Wardak, Parwan, and Paktia receive treatment and medication services free of charge. Over the

¹⁰ Australian National University. (2024, February). *The forecast*.

<https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/research/projects/atrocity-forecasting/forecasts>

¹¹ George Washington University. (2022). *The risks facing Hazaras in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan*.

<https://extremism.gwu.edu/risks-facing-hazaras-in-taliban-ruled-afghanistan>

past four years, security threats against Hazaras have not decreased—instead, they have changed in nature and become more complex. Previously, threats were mainly in the form of suicide attacks, bombings, and mass killings; now, patterns have shifted toward targeted assassinations, structural weakening, systematic spying, and gradual suppression.

Furthermore, the Taliban have facilitated the gradual infiltration of ISIS-Khorasan into central, northwestern, and northern Afghanistan. Individuals suspected of collaborating with ISIS within Taliban ranks include:

Mawlawi Shaheen (former Taliban intelligence chief in Bamyan), Qari Umeir (assistant in District 18, Dasht-e-Barchi), Head of the Intelligence Office in Herat, Juma Khan Fateh (in the Darwaz districts of Badakhshan), Mawlawi Izharuddin (police chief of Jurm district, Badakhshan) and dozens of others in Badakhshan, Herat, and Maidan Wardak who have either defected from the Taliban to join ISIS or are working for both groups simultaneously. This is only an example of the widespread ISIS presence and Taliban collaboration aimed at further weakening the Hazaras.¹²

In response to a question about changes in the pattern and nature of attacks against Hazaras, they stated:

The types of attacks against Hazaras are now more covert, targeted, systematic, and calculated. Some tactics used by the Taliban include abducting women from streets, markets, and alleyways under the pretext of improper hijab, subjecting them to sexual assault, and in some cases using these acts for forced reproduction. A specific example of this was reported in Kotal Rawza between Ghazni and Maidan Wardak. In central regions, the Taliban have banned the Hazara people from holding religious and cultural events, including Nowruz, offering vows, prayers, and memorial gatherings at cemeteries. Construction for Hazaras in cities has been prohibited. Access to water in Hazara-inhabited areas—especially in western Kabul—has been deliberately and systematically cut off. These pressures have forced Hazara families either to migrate or be pushed back into their villages.

When asked whether the Taliban are a threat or a protector of the Hazaras' security, they replied:

The Taliban have not only failed to play any role in ensuring the security of the Hazaras but have become one of the largest organized threats against this community. By gradually removing

¹² A participant who for security reasons remains anonymous.

Hazaras from official institutions, imposing structural restrictions, ethnically reshaping geographic areas, and enforcing religious repression, they are effectively moving toward erasing the Hazara identity. In multiple instances, when conflicts have arisen between local residents and Kuchi nomads, the Taliban have immediately sided with the Kuchis, even paying their blood money. However, if Hazaras are harmed, there is no possible legal recourse or justice. Additionally, some religious leaders and influential figures in the Hazara community—whether knowingly or unknowingly—cooperate with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or ISIS in intelligence-sharing. This is one of the Taliban's dangerous tactics to dismantle social cohesion within the Hazara community.

According to them, Hazara populated regions that have experienced the most pressure, threats, and repression over the past four years include: Behsud (Maidan Wardak), Nawar (Ghazni), Daikundi (especially districts bordering Pashtun areas), Khas Uruzgan, Balkhab (Sar-e-Pol), Badakhshan (Hazara-inhabited areas including Argo, Darayem, and the Darwaz districts), Jebrael (Herat), and Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul (which, despite being urban, suffers from severe security, economic, and religious pressures).

They believe that if this trend continues and the international community remains indifferent, the possibility of a silent genocide and widespread humanitarian catastrophe is highly likely. They recommended the following:

- Systematic documentation of security and social violations against Hazaras and submission to international bodies, especially the UN and international courts.
- Coordination among elites, local forces, and migrants to organize intelligent resistance.
- Creation of support and protection mechanisms for the families of victims, survivors, and threatened activists.
- Development of alternative security and political plans to preserve and save the Hazara community's social, cultural, and geographical structure.

In another interview with the Bolaq Analysts Network, Ms. Salima Mazari analyzed the general security situation of Hazaras under Taliban rule as follows:

Overall, the security situation of Hazaras under the Taliban's illegitimate rule is much worse than during the Republic. Targeted attacks on Hazara gathering centers, random assassinations

in Hazara residential areas in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, and other cities, systematic land grabs by Kuchis with Taliban support, extortion and targeted killings of Hazaras, mass removal of Hazara employees from various government departments, and abduction of girls and women from Hazara areas under the pretext of hijab—all indicate that the Hazaras' security situation over these four years has deteriorated significantly compared to the past. All Hazara-inhabited areas in both cities and villages are targeted by insecurity policies, but in rural areas, land-grabbing projects and extortion are added to the problem.

Regarding whether terrorist attacks against Hazaras have increased or decreased in the fourth year of Taliban rule, Ms. Mazari stated:

Security threats against Hazaras have not decreased but have increased, becoming more systematic and violent in nature. If this situation continues, the future of the Hazara social and political presence in Afghanistan will be completely affected, leading to the total removal of Hazaras from all social and political spheres in Afghanistan and resulting in mass forced migrations.

Ms. Mazari also considered the Taliban responsible for insecurity against Hazaras, adding:

As the entity responsible for ensuring the security of Afghan citizens, the Taliban not only fail to fulfill this duty but also actively cooperate with other terrorist groups to create an insecure environment for the social life of Hazaras, systematically and deliberately seeking to make life unsafe for the Hazaras in Afghanistan.¹³


According to findings from the Bolaq Analysts Network, the security situation in the Hazara areas worsened over the past year, as the average score for this question was 4.1 out of 5. Respondents were asked: "To what extent do you agree with this statement: The general security in the Hazara area where I live have worsened over the past year." Out of 355 respondents:

- 172 respondents (48.50%) strongly agreed
- 96 respondents (27%) agreed
- 61 respondents (17.2%) somewhat agreed

¹³ Salima Mazari was a politician and former district governor of Charkent in Balkh Province (a woman and of Hazara ethnicity) in Afghanistan. She was the commander of the Popular Uprising Forces.

- 10 respondents (2.8%) strongly disagreed
- 16 respondents (4.5%) disagreed

The distribution is shown in figure 1



In the following section, we examine the security situation of the Hazaras under Taliban rule in three areas: terrorist incidents, land seizures and forced displacement, and the Taliban extortion and intimidation in Hazara-inhabited areas.

2.1 Terrorist Incidents

According to the findings of this research, terrorist incidents remain just as powerful but have changed in form; those who previously carried out suicide and terrorist attacks now hold power and can use any tactic to achieve their goals. Terrorist attacks against the Hazaras by this group are no longer in the form of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices but instead take the form of easily assassinating Hazaras or attacking their homes and killing them. Below are examples of terrorist incidents against the Hazaras during the fourth year of Taliban rule.

In Ashkar Abad village of Shahrستان district, Daikundi province, on Thursday night, August 22, 2024, at around 11:00 p.m., four individuals—two armed with Kalashnikovs and two carrying

large knives—entered the home of Shir Ali with the intent to kill. These four, who spoke Pashto, upon learning that Shir Ali was not home, asked Gol Jan (daughter of Ghulam Hussain and wife of Shir Ali) and Abdul Ghafour (son of Jafar and Shir Ali's son-in-law) where he was. When realized he was absent, they opened fire on Gol Jan and Abdul Ghafour. Gol Jan was hit by one bullet in the chest, which exited through her shoulder; Abdul Ghafour was shot nine times—once in the head and the rest in the chest and abdomen—resulting in the death of both victims on the spot.¹⁴

Qariodhal village in Sangtakht and Bandar district of Daikundi province lies on the border between Daikundi and Ghor provinces and is mostly inhabited by Hazaras. On September 12, 2024, a group of 15–18 Hazaras traveling on several motorcycles to welcome a few pilgrims returning from Iraq toward the Daikundi–Ghor border were suddenly stopped by four armed men riding two motorcycles. The attackers, identifying themselves as Taliban members, asked the travelers to line up for a group photo. At that moment, another motorcyclist from Ghor arrived and was also stopped. The rider pleaded to be allowed to continue, but the attackers shot him and then opened fire on the lined-up Hazaras. In the chaos, some Hazaras fled; many were hit in the arms and hands but managed to survive by hiding behind rocks and jumping into ditches. This deadly attack left 14 dead and four wounded. ISIS later claimed responsibility.¹⁵

The Taliban have consistently suppressed civil activists, often killing or forcing them into disappearance. One example is the death of Hamza Olfat, originally from Daikundi province and a resident of Kabul, who was a civil activist and founder of the anti-Taliban protest movement. On February 9, 2023, he was arrested by the Taliban in Dasht-e-Barchi and, after a severe torture, released in July 2023. Following his release, he fled to Iran. On January 16, 2024, he secretly re-entered Afghanistan to visit his mother in Daikundi for the last time before traveling to Pakistan and then seeking asylum in a Western country. However, he was shot by the Taliban and died on January 19, 2025.¹⁶

¹⁴. Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Ashkar Abad Village, Daikundi Ashkar Abad Sharistan*. <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/> (Accessed July 20, 2025)

¹⁵. Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Kotal-e-Qrewdal, Daikundi*. <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/kotal-e-qrewdal-daikundi/> (Accessed July 20, 2025)

¹⁶. Afghanistan International. (2025, January). *Conflicting reports emerge about death of activist & former Taliban prisoner*. <https://www.afintl.com/en/202501205286> (Accessed July 20, 2025)

After the Taliban's takeover, Kuchi nomads carried out multiple attacks on Hazara-inhabited areas to seize their lands, resulting in the loss of life among the Hazara communities. On June 22, 2025, armed Kuchis attacked the village of Taytakht Giroi Borjagi in Nawar district of Ghazni province, bringing their herds, which destroyed locals' farmlands. When residents tried to block them, verbal disputes broke out, followed by armed Kuchis beating locals with rifle butts. During the violence, Mohammad Jan, father of Mohammad Latif, was injured. At that moment, one armed Kuchi fired from a distance, killing Mohammad Latif. Alongside killing him and injuring his father, the armed Kuchis also beat and wounded several other villagers.¹⁷

In the most recent terrorist incident, on July 29, 2025, Mojtaba Naqavi and his father were working in their agricultural fields when Kuchi sheep herds invaded their crops. Mojtaba tried to prevent the sheep from entering their land but was suddenly shot by armed Kuchis. He died from a heavy blood loss, and his father was severely injured.¹⁸

These incidents clearly show that terrorism against the Hazaras in the fourth year of Taliban rule has not decreased but has instead taken on a more complex, organized, and direct form. Targeted assassinations, night raids on homes, mass killings along public roads, and violent incursions by armed Kuchis into Hazara villages all demonstrate the continuation of a policy aimed at the physical and psychological elimination of Hazara people. While the Taliban present themselves as "guarantors of security," many of these attacks have either been carried out by individuals linked to them or have been met with deliberate negligence and inaction. This pattern of violence has left the Hazaras in a state of constant insecurity, fear, and complete vulnerability, ringing the alarm for a looming humanitarian disaster and a silent genocide.

2.2 Land Seizures and Forced Displacement

Four years after the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, the situation of the Hazara people remains critical. One of the most significant aspects of this crisis is the seizure of the Hazaras' historical lands and their transfer to armed groups and Kuchi nomads, which have had serious


¹⁷ Silk Road. (2025, June 27). *Kuchi invasion of Nahur, Ghazni; How was Mohammad Latif Qurbani killed?* <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/15462/> (Accessed July 20, 2025)

¹⁸ Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Mujtaba Naqavi project*. <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/project/mujtaba-naqavi/>

security and humanitarian consequences. During 2024–2025, this process has continued systematically and extensively in the Hazara-inhabited areas of Afghanistan.

Respondents to the survey reported that, in the past year, they had been forced into internal displacement and relocation. The average score for the forced displacement and internal relocation of Hazaras was 3.6 out of 5. Based on this average, most of the displaced Hazaras over the past year were forcibly moved. Out of 355 participants in this survey, 140 people (39.40%) were forced into internal displacement and relocation.

The distribution is shown in figure 2




Based on field data, interviews with Hazara residents in various regions including Panjab and the center of Bamiyan Province, residents of Golku and Temki village in Qarabagh District of Ghazni Province, as well as a review of media reports, the findings are as follows:

Land Seizure in the Villages of Haftad Madyan Temki, Wagh, Sar Darya, Berki, and Dasht-e Bagh Attar, Qarabagh District, Ghazni:

One prominent example is the land seizure by a man named *Kamran*, one of the powerful Taliban commanders in Qarabagh. After 2021, Kamran, using his military power and influence, altered

the boundaries of historical Hazara lands in Haftad Madyan and forcibly took possession of dozens of *jeribs* of land. Local residents repeatedly traveled to Kabul to request the return of their land, but Kamran initially refused. Later, after receiving 300,000 Afghanis, he returned part of the land using a forged deed and threatened the people not to publicize the matter

Map 2: Land seized by Kamran, Haftad Madyan, Temki village, Qarabagh District, Ghazni Province



Kamran, a powerful and influential Taliban figure in Ghazni, had been active as a local commander and later as a Taliban-appointed district governor in Qarabagh even before their return to power in 2021. Documented evidence shows that before 2021, he made travel routes for Hazara people unsafe. Local reports mention targeted killings of several Hazara citizens

passing through Qarabagh, including *teacher Sekandar* and *Bismillah Mobarez*, who were killed by his men.¹⁹

After the Taliban regained power in 2021, Kamran began seizing the land of Temki villagers through military intimidation, political pressure, and personal influence. In late 2024 and early 2025, he used personal tractors to move traditional and natural boundaries and began digging wells and farming inside the Hazara lands without permission, consent, or official documentation, resulting in the loss of dozens of *jeribs* of land for locals.

One resident said that after the Temki villagers learned about this illegal seizure, a delegation of elders traveled to Kabul several times to meet Kamran. In these meetings, he was told that the land seizure was unlawful and unjust, but Kamran rejected their requests, accused them of possessing weapons, and in some cases threatened military action.

In response, the Temki villagers collectively filled in the well dug on the seized land. After this act, Kamran escalated his threats, but eventually a meeting between the parties was held in Kabul. In that meeting, Kamran stated he would only return the land if the people paid him “financial compensation.” As a result, 300,000 Afghanis were extorted from the villagers. Even then, only a small portion of the land was returned, and for that, a forged official deed was issued.²⁰

According to a report published on November 15, 2023 by *Etilaat Roz* newspaper, “Hundreds of jeribs of land belonging to Hazaras in Qarabagh District, Ghazni Province, have been seized by the Taliban. Sources say the Taliban recently seized hundreds of jeribs in Dasht-e Bagh Attar, part of Golku area in Qarabagh District, to build a residential township, and construction has begun.”²¹

¹⁹ Report submitted by local sources

²⁰ Report submitted by local sources

²¹ *Etilaat Roz (8am Daily)*. (2024, September 28). *Transfer of indigenous people’s property to Kuchis; The Taliban’s decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination*. <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>

Map 3: Land seized for a residential township for Durand Line settlers – housing for Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters – Dasht-e Bagh Attar, Qarabagh District, Ghazni Province)



Sources claim this land has belonged to the Hazaras for years, with ownership documents in hand, but the Taliban ignored these documents. They say the seizure and suspicious construction triggered public outcry, forcing the Taliban to temporarily halt building. However, sources emphasize that as of the past week, the Taliban have resumed construction at a faster pace, and complaints to Taliban courts have brought no results.

Another resident of Golku, Qarabagh District, said:

“The Hazaras of Qarabagh, Ghazni, have lost all their fertile and productive lands over the years under oppressive and ethnically biased governments, retaining only memories of their ancestral lands. The only remaining fertile land in Hazara possession was Dasht-e Bagh Attar in Golku, which is now being turned into a township for Pashtuns from across the border and TTP (Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan) fighters. This is despite the Golku residents having lawful ownership documents and paying taxes during various periods, including the previous Taliban regime. For years, representatives of the people have knocked on every door seeking their rights, but they have been met with indifference, humiliation, and discrimination, with no resolution.”

Meanwhile, according to *Etilaat Roz* on September 2, 2024, the Taliban awarded dozens of jeribs of agricultural land and pastures in Wagh, Sar Darya, and Berki villages of Qarabagh District to *Kuchis* in an “unjust” ruling.²²

2.3 Forced Displacement of Rashak Village Residents, Bamiyan

Rashak village, part of Pushta-e Ghorghori area, Panjab District, Bamiyan Province, first faced claims in 2022 by two *Kuchis* named *Tata* and *Yaghol* over ownership of village land. When these claims failed, two other *Kuchis*—*Awal Gul* and *Wardak*—on August 27, 2024 submitted another claim to Panjab District against part of Rashak’s lands.

The investigative team from Bolaq Analysts Network interviewed a Rashak resident on July 25, 2025 in Kabul, who said that during the report’s preparation, their village had already been handed over to *Kuchis*, and they had been forced to leave.

Another resident of Panjab, Bamiyan, said they have legal and customary deeds and have lived there for generations. The official deeds of some Pushta-e Ghorghori residents date back to 1947, while the *Kuchis*’ forged deeds are dated 1958, with no record in the court archives. The seller in the *Kuchi* deed is also a *Kuchi*, not a local.

²² *Etilaat Roz (8am Daily)*. (2025, September 2). *Forced displacement of dozens of families in Ghazni; The Taliban handed over the land of the inhabitants of three villages to the Kuchis*. <https://8am.media/fa/forced-migration-of-dozens-of-families-in-ghazni-the-taliban-handed-over-the-land-of-the-inhabitants-of-three-villages-to-the-nomads/>

On July 29, 2025, the Taliban forcibly displaced 25 Hazara families from Rashak village and gave their homes and lands to Pashtun Kuchis.

Map 4: Land seized in Pushta-e Ghorghori, Panjab District, Bamiyan Province)



A local source told *Oxus*: “Although village men, especially elders, had fled to avoid forced signatures during enforcement, the Taliban forcibly removed household belongings and locked the doors.”²³

²³ Oxus. (2025, July 29). *Forced displacement and land grab; The Taliban gave a Hazara village in Bamiyan to Pashtun nomads*. <https://oxus.tv/2025/07/29/forced-displacement-and-land-grab-taliban-give-a-hazara-village-in-bamiyan-to-pashtun-nomads/>

2.4 Patterns of Land Grabbing

A) Validation of Forged Documents:

According to findings from the Bolaq Analysts Network, the Taliban have initiated plans to validate forged documents of the *Kuchi* nomads to seize lands belonging to the Hazara people. For example, they have established a judicial commission within the Bamyan court. This commission, composed of four judges, was formed to confirm documents that have no official registration record, specifically approving the Kuchis' claims.

A local government employee in Bamyan says:

“The Taliban in the Bamyan provincial court have created a judicial commission made up of four judges to give legal credibility to title deeds that lack official registration and cannot be found in the court's archive, validating them based on comparison or ‘similarity and resemblance’. This is done even without looking at the similarity.”

The Taliban have abolished the district court in *Waras* and combined the courts for Waras and Panjab districts into one, while keeping the courts in *Kahmard*, *Shibar*, and *Saighan*—districts with some Sunni populations—despite their smaller populations compared to Waras and Panjab.²⁴

B) Armed Kuchi Raids and Deliberate Taliban Negligence:

On July 29, 2025, an article titled “*A New Phase of Land Occupation and Forced Displacement*”, published by *Etilaat Roz* newspaper, highlighted three stages of occupation methods used by the Taliban in central Afghanistan. These three stages are:

1. The Kuchis flood into local indigenous areas and clash with the residents.
2. The Kuchis then file complaints to the Taliban authorities, alleging that locals are obstructing their movement and use of pastures.

²⁴ In an interview with a Bamyan local government employee.

3. The Taliban court steps in to arbitrate and *always without exception* rules in favor of the Kuchis, declaring that the locals are living on “seized land” and must vacate their homes and lands immediately.²⁵

A local government employee in the province of Bamiyan says:

“In the case of the armed Kuchi attack on Sorkh Joy in Waras district, the Taliban refused to accept the locals’ complaint and deliberately neglected to address the raid.”

Unnamed local sources stress that the Taliban’s negligence in stopping armed Kuchi attacks on Hazara villages is aimed at spreading fear so that residents abandon their lands quietly, without any resistance.

As previously mentioned in the section on terrorist incidents, *Etilaat Roz* reported on July 29 the killing of a resident of Behsud, Maidan Wardak by Kuchis. Local sources in Hesa-e-Awal Behsud district confirmed to the newspaper that “armed Kuchis” shot dead a young Hazara man named *Mojtaba Naqavi* around 11:00 am on Tuesday, July 29, in the *Shahr-e-Niru* area. According to the source, Mojtaba was shot after he tried to stop the Kuchis’ livestock from entering his farmland. Reportedly three armed Kuchis were involved in the incident.²⁶

C) Responses from Interviews on Land Grabbing and Taliban Pressure:

1. Aliabad area, District 12, Mazar-e-Sharif:

Since the early days of Taliban rule, the area has been embroiled in land disputes. The Taliban have arrested, tortured, and even forced into exile several local elders who opposed forced displacement and land claims. They have also planted local Hazara informants to infiltrate and suppress opposition. Land grabbing occurs in other parts of Mazar too, but Aliabad—home to about 5,000 Hazara families—has seen an influx of Pashtuns (including Kuchis and Uzbeks) in recent years. Although, the exact objective of the Pashtun influx is unclear—possibly espionage—it has created an atmosphere of fear and anxiety among the Hazaras. Security checkpoints and posts have been set up to hold the Hazara residents under close surveillance.

²⁵ *Etilaat Roz*. (2025, July 29). A new phase of land occupation and forced displacement.

<https://storage.googleapis.com/qurium/www.etilaatroz.com/236754-forced-displacement-in-afghanistan.html>

²⁶ The same reference as number 26.

2. *A Hazara from Ghazni living in Imam Sahib, Kunduz:*

“In Imam Sahib district, in Basus market, Jali Kul or Taka Boz village, I own farmland with a legal deed. The Taliban forcibly took it, claiming it was state property. I have a video recording of the incident. My life is in danger, and I have left the country.”

The land grabbing of the Hazaras in the fourth year of Taliban rule reflects deliberate social engineering—a discriminatory and violent strategy to remove the ethnic group. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has admitted on TOLO TV that migrants from the Durand Line border area are being resettled in central Afghanistan. Observations and local interviews reveal that these migrants include extremist groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP).²⁷

The use of judicial mechanisms, forged documents, military intimidation, and collaboration with armed Kuchis illustrates a deliberate system to eliminate and forcibly displace Hazaras from their ancestral lands. This is not only a threat to their physical safety but also an attempt to erase their historical memory and connection to the land.

2.5 Taliban Bullying and Extortion in Hazara Areas

In the past year, most citizens of Afghanistan regardless of their ethnicity have faced widespread bullying and extortion at the hands of the Taliban. However, the Hazaras—due to their ethnicity and Shia faith—were disproportionately impacted by both direct and indirect forms of violations by the group. Some of these violations include the following:

A) Imposing Taliban Tribal Culture on Hazara Residents:

In all Hazara areas, the Taliban have handed control of affairs to the Pashtun Taliban, who are linguistically, culturally, and religiously alien to the Hazaras. They impose their tribal customs as if they were Islamic law, creating fear, severe social restrictions, and psychological harm—especially to women and girls.

In Bamyan—where the Hazaras constitute a majority—there are over 20 provincial directorates. However, of these 20 directorates only five—Public Health, Public Works, Environment, Martyrs

²⁷ Tolo News. (2025). *Waziristan refugees to be relocated in north, south, center: Mujahid*. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-183754?utm_source=chatgpt.com

& Disabled, and Urban Development—are nominally headed by Hazaras. These Hazara directors, however, have no real authority. For instance, the Public Health director, is overshadowed by “Nezam,” the governor’s brother, who has full control over the operations of the directorate.²⁸

In Daikundi and other Hazara districts which are governed by non-Hazara provinces, the situation is even worse. Hazaras are employed only in roles requiring technical expertise, and even then, a Taliban minder is assigned to monitor them.

In Jaghori district, local administration is split between two Taliban Pashtun factions: civil affairs are run by Taliban from Zabul, and military affairs by Taliban from Qarabagh district of Ghazni.

B) Validation of Kuchi Land Claims via “Judicial Commission”:

As noted earlier under land grabbing, this is a major ongoing form of extortion. In Bamyan, the commission is chaired by *Mir Agha Hashimi*—a Kuchi and resident of Kalich, Bamyan—who bypasses even Taliban legal procedures.²⁹ For example, regarding five plots in *Rashak Pushta Gharghari* (Panjab district), claimed by Kuchis, the head of the appeals court forced the civil court judge to approve the Kuchi claim in a closed-door meeting which was later enforced—despite the fact that locals have title deeds issued 11 years before the Kuchi documents.³⁰

C) Blocking Access to Courts:

The Taliban have removed primary courts from some Hazara districts, keeping people away from even their own “Taliban law.” For example, the size and population of Waras district renders it eligible to form a separate province or at least two districts. However, despite this, the district shares a single primary court with Panjab, located in Panjab, which is very hard to reach. Similar situations exist in Yakawlang No. 2 district and in Ghazni’s Hazara areas such as Jaghori and Malistan.³¹

²⁸ Interview with a local resident

²⁹ Interviews with local residents and victims

³⁰ Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 13). *The Taliban have ordered the evacuation of Rashak Village in Bamyan Province.* <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/15499/>

³¹ According to the local people talking

D) Bribery and Extortion:

In Hazara-populated areas under Taliban control, government offices have increasingly engaged in bribery and extortion. In Malistan district, the Taliban-appointed governor, Muntaqim, is reported to personally solicit bribes under various pretexts and to interfere in religious and cultural affairs. In spring last year, during Eid al-Fitr, when local residents observed the holiday one day later than the Taliban's official announcement, some were forcibly compelled to break their fast early to conform with the Taliban-declared date.

In Jaghori district, residents are required to obtain permission from the Taliban-controlled district authorities for basic construction needs, such as acquiring a truckload of stones or soil.³² This permission is contingent on the payment of a fee, effectively creating an additional, informal tax on essential materials.³³

1. Additional Taxes and Restrictions in Bamiyan and Lal wa Sarjangal

Over the past year, Taliban authorities have levied additional taxes under various pretexts on the Hazara population. In the Lal wa Sarjangal district bazaar, the municipality, together with the *Amr bil Ma'ruf* (Vice and Virtue) department, ordered shopkeepers to either dismantle small heated waiting areas in front of their shops or pay an extra tax. Implementation has been accompanied by harsh treatment, including the beating of elderly men. While the plan has not yet been fully enforced, officials continue efforts to impose it. In Bamiyan bazaar, Taliban authorities have also banned local guesthouses from hosting foreign tourists, further restricting economic activity.³⁴

The Taliban-administered *Ushr* tax has no consistent standard and is applied arbitrarily, often leading to excessive and unpredictable charges. In Lal wa Sarjangal district, one farmer was required to pay 6,000 Afghanis for 600 seer (4,200 kg) of potatoes, while another farmer, for the same quantity, was charged 16,000 Afghanis. This disparity highlights the lack of regulation and the exploitative nature of the tax collection process.³⁵

³² Etilaat Roz. (2025, March 30). *Difference in Eid day; Taliban in Malistan, Ghazni "forcibly" made Shiites eat bread and water.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/226629/مالستان-غزنی-روزه/>

³³ Interview with the local residents

³⁴ Conversation with local people and marketers

³⁵ Interview with the local residents

In Bamiyan bazaar, shopkeepers are required to pay a monthly “night guard fee” to fund the salaries of guards who protect the market from theft. Previously set at 100 Afghanis per shop per month, the Taliban have doubled the fee to 200 Afghanis, adding to the financial burden on local traders.³⁶

2. Restrictions on Hospitality Businesses in Bamiyan City

In Bamiyan city, hotels, restaurants, and guesthouses are prohibited from renting rooms to foreign guests and tourists. Violators face fines. Only a select few establishments—mostly operated by Taliban affiliates and non-Hazara individuals—are permitted to host foreign visitors.

3. Perceptions of Increased Illegal Taxation


Research findings indicate that the appointment of Taliban members to government offices has contributed to a significant rise in illegal tax collection. On a scale of 1 to 5, the average response score was 4.5, showing that the majority of Hazara respondents believe illegal taxation has increased under Taliban-appointed officials. Out of 355 interviewees:

- 239 (67.3%) strongly agreed
- 71 (20%) agreed
- 33 (9.3%) somewhat agreed
- 3 (0.8%) strongly disagreed
- 9 (2.5%) disagree

The distribution is shown in figure 3

³⁶ Conversation with local people and businessmen in Bamiyan Hazara

Figure 3: Surge in Illicit Tax Collection Following the Appointment of Taliban Personnel to Government Offices



2.6 Tourism and Government Contracts:


Other issues which have direct relation to the economic situation of the Hazaras, and the Taliban are resorting to extortion, include the tourism contracts that are given either to the Taliban companies or to the Taliban-linked companies. In Bamiyan, all contracts are signed under the supervision of “Ghazi,” the governor’s brother.³⁷ Development budgets which were to be fairly distributed nationwide, are removed from the Hazara populated provinces, leaving lasting effects as well as worsening poverty, unemployment, and inequality among the Hazaras.

Survey findings show the average agreement score among Hazaras on whether economic projects are fairly distributed in their areas is **1.7 out of 5**. Out of 355 respondents:

- 198 (55.8%) completely disagree
- 88 (24.8%) disagree
- 36 (10.1%) somewhat agree
- 23 (6.5%) completely agree
- 9 (2.5%) agree

³⁷ According to Bamiyan’s residents

The distribution is shown in figure 4



2.7 Community Testimonies of Taliban Pressure, Discrimination, and Security Threats

In response to an open-ended survey question, several Hazara residents shared firsthand accounts of Taliban-imposed pressure, discriminatory practices, and security threats:

1. *Dawlatyar District, Ghor Province:*

“I had gone to the Keshrow Valley in Dawlatyar district, Ghor province, on a work trip. The Hazaras of this area have lived in this valley for over 400 years. During the two nights I stayed there, I personally saw between 30 and 50 Taliban fighters living in the mosque, forcing the local people to cover all their expenses, including food and clothing. They also forced local residents into displacement.”

2. *Uruzgan Province:*

“The Hazaras of Uruzgan live under extremely harsh conditions under Taliban rule. They are forced to pay heavy taxes to this group. The Hazaras here live like slaves. The Taliban have

imposed taxes on everything, even the smallest agricultural products such as wheat, fruit trees, and firewood. In some small villages, hundreds of Taliban fighters live and compel locals to provide all their expenses, including food, clothing, and transportation.”

3. *Jaghori District, Ghazni Province:*

“The Taliban treat the Hazara people in a very ugly and inappropriate manner. Not only do they provide no help, but they also seize all their resources through illegal taxation. People in Jaghori, Ghazni province, who request money from their relatives abroad for construction, digging water wells, and other needs, have all that money forcibly taken from them by the Taliban.”

4. *General Restrictions:*

“The Taliban forcibly collect money from people and do not allow anyone to build. Even if someone mud-plasters the roof of their own house, they must pay the Taliban for it.”

2.8 Indirect Bullying Through Support of Other Groups

In the village of Kandir, Gizab district, Uruzgan province, the Taliban compelled local residents to pay thirty million Afghanis in “conciliation fees” and “land prices” to three Pashtun tribes from Gizab and nomadic Kochis from Helmand.³⁸ This amount was paid in several installments over more than a year, with the final installment handed over to the Gizab and Helmand recipients on 22 Dalwa 1403 (10 February 2025).³⁹

In a similar act of supporting outside groups against local Hazara residents, on 12 Sonbola 1403 (2 September 2024), the Taliban’s primary court in Nahur district, Ghazni province, issued a ruling in a legal dispute between local Hazaras and Kochis. The court ordered that the Hazara

³⁸ Etilaat Roz. (2024, August 27). *Kuchis in Behsud received compensation from local residents for the burning of their vehicle.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/209299/کوجیهادر-بهسود-بہخاطر-سوختن-موتورش>

³⁹ Etilaat Roz. (2025, March 13). *Extortion; to preserve the last piece of ancestral land* [Video]. <https://youtu.be/YUpjG0AwgyQ?si=44P1Lu8ihpEFv0jS>

residents must, within less than a month, surrender all their immovable property to the Kochis and vacate the area.⁴⁰

On 21 Asad 1403 (11 August 2024), in the “Shinya Mark” market area of Behsud, an old, unusable Kuchi vehicle and motorcycle were mysteriously set on fire. Five local residents who attempted to extinguish the fire were subsequently ordered by the Behsud primary court to pay 185,000 Afghanis in compensation to the Kochis.⁴¹

In 2025, Taliban authorities in Panjab and Waras districts of Bamiyan province have openly supported Kochis, enabling them to pressure and bully local Hazara communities. For example, in Daraz Qul, Panjab, interactions between Kochis and locals had historically been relatively peaceful, with occasional unintentional tensions. However, about a month ago, when local elders approached the Kochis to stop trampling farmlands and feeding their herds on local crops, the Kochis responded with violence, beating several community members without any attempt at dialogue. When locals sought help from Taliban security officials in Panjab, reinforcements arrived only after a several-hour delay, exacerbating the community’s sense of insecurity.

The health condition of the two men beaten in Daraz Qul is extremely serious; they are unable to speak or identify their attackers. Similarly, in the Mehr and Tarapas areas of Panjab, the Kochis have not only destroyed local crops but also cut off agricultural water supplies by damaging irrigation pipes that bring water from the Naw-e-Jani area. Despite locals reporting this deliberate sabotage to Taliban district authorities, no action was taken to address the situation.⁴²

When the Taliban authorities failed to address the issue, locals had no choice but to take the matter into their own hands.⁴³ When confronted by local residents asking, “Why are you doing this?”, the Kochis arrogantly responded, “This is our land—who are you to stop us?” They then proceeded to beat locals, threatened them with firearms, and fire live rounds into the

⁴⁰ Hasht-e Subh. (2024, September 28). *Transfer of ownership from locals to Kuchis; the Taliban’s decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination*. <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>

⁴¹ Interview with the family of the assaulted individual, visit to assess the individual’s condition, and interview with local residents.

⁴² Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 6). *Three residents of Punjab District, Bamiyan Province, were beaten by armed Kuchis*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15466/>

⁴³ From conversations with people present in the area and residents

community. This occurs despite the Taliban's repeated public calls to disarm all "irresponsible armed individuals" and their annual house-to-house weapons searches in Hazara villages, during which many residents are accused of possessing arms, forcibly disarmed, and imprisoned temporarily. Meanwhile, Kochis freely enter Hazara areas armed, intimidate residents, and in some instances, have fired upon women and children, causing injuries. The Taliban have remained silent toward these armed Kochis and appear to actively support their actions against the Hazara population.⁴⁴

In another incident following clashes between Kochis and residents of Surkhjoy, Waras district, local residents sought a criminal investigation from district authorities. However, their complaints were refused, and they were turned away without any action.⁴⁵

The Taliban have also supported a man named Haji Abdul Hamid, who, in cooperation with the Kochis, claims ownership over the entire Waras district market and its government buildings. Despite local merchants filing a case against him, the Taliban have remained silent, and there is a high likelihood that any official ruling will favor Abdul Hamid and the Kochis.

Overall, evidence from Hazara-inhabited areas of Afghanistan reveals that the Taliban are implementing organized policies of bullying, extortion, and systematic marginalization against the Hazara people. These practices foster an atmosphere of fear, deny justice, undermine psychological and economic security, and contribute to the gradual dispossession of Hazara land ownership. Beyond economic hardship, insecurity, and severe restrictions, locals are also deprived of fundamental civil rights, including access to justice and public services

⁴⁴ From conversations with residents

⁴⁵ PRIO. (2023, October). *Afghanistan ranks bottom of global index on women's status*. <https://www.prio.org/news/3476>


Chapter Three: Social Situation

The Taliban's systematic exclusion of the Hazara people from equitable access to social services, participation in government, and fair treatment has deepened their marginalization. This includes restrictions on education, healthcare, and government institutions; discrimination in the allocation of international humanitarian aid; the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of Hazara girls; the forced displacement of Hazara families; and severe limits on employment opportunities and political participation.

According to the findings of Bolaq Analysts Network, the Taliban's appointment of its members to senior positions in government agencies has intensified cultural and religious prejudice and heightened psychological insecurity within the Hazara community. Survey data reflects this perception: **Mean score: 4.7 out of 5, Responses (N = 355):**

- *Strongly agreed:* 304 (85.6%)
- *Agreed:* 36 (10.1%)
- *Somewhat agreed:* 6 (1.7%)
- *Disagreed:* 3 (0.8%)
- *Strongly disagreed:* 6 (1.7%)

The distribution is shown in Figure 5




Access to services has become increasingly difficult under Taliban rule. The appointment of Taliban officials to key government roles and the deliberate marginalization of the Hazara population have worsened the situation. Respondents were asked about changes in access to healthcare services: of the 355 participants:

- *Strongly agreed*: 182 (51.3%) — it had become more difficult
- *Agreed*: 88 (24.8%)
- *Somewhat agreed*: 56 (15.8%)
- *Disagreed*: 7 (2.0%)
- *Strongly disagreed*: 22 (6.2%)

The mean score for this item was 4.1 out of 5, indicating that, Most Hazaras believe healthcare access has deteriorated over the past year.

The distribution is shown in Figure 6



1.3 The Status of Women: Denial of Education, Higher Education, and Employment

Since the Taliban's return to power, Afghanistan has become one of the most repressive countries in the world for women and girls. A series of oppressive decrees, aimed exclusively at them, has made daily life unbearable. The Women, Peace, and Security Index (October 2023) ranked Afghanistan near the bottom of 177 countries, based on 13 indicators covering education, higher education, employment, legal rights, and gender-based violence. Since the Taliban's resurgence, women in Afghanistan have been forced into a relentless, day-in, day-out

existence stripped of inspiration and bereft of hope for the future.⁴⁶ Discriminatory Taliban policies have stripped women of basic human rights, producing deep psychological, socio-economic, and developmental crises, amounting to gender apartheid.

Although women in Afghanistan had only limited access to certain rights even before the Taliban's return to power, their circumstances, at their best, remained deeply precarious. For instance, in 2011, a Thomson Reuters Foundation survey ranked Afghanistan the bottom of the global index on women's status. The findings were based on input from over 200 experts in international aid, academia, healthcare, policymaking, journalism, and development, all selected for their expertise in gender issues. Countries were assessed across six risk factors: healthcare, discrimination and access to resources, cultural and religious practices, sexual violence, human trafficking, and conflict-related violence. Afghanistan was identified as the most dangerous country for women due to targeted attacks on female government officials, widespread gender-based violence, poor access to healthcare, and extreme poverty. Gender inequality and abuse remain entrenched, with women and girls facing forced marriages, "honor" killings, the exchange of women to settle disputes, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement. These practices are particularly prevalent in rural areas, where many families continue to bar mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters from public participation. Large numbers of girls are denied basic education, and girls' schools are frequent targets of arson.⁴⁷

The Taliban's resurgence has systematically stripped women in Afghanistan, particularly Hazara women, of their rights and freedoms. The Hazara community, aligned with modern values and committed to women's rights, has long championed girls' access to education. This commitment has been substantive: even in the most remote areas, Hazaras have ensured that their daughters attended school and university, leading to a significant number of educated Hazara women entering the workforce. Since the Taliban's return to power and the subsequent closure of educational institutions for girls, the Hazara community has borne disproportionate hardships. The Taliban have not only denied Hazara girls' access to education but have also

46. Prio. (October 2023). Afghanistan Ranks Bottom of Global Index on Women's Status, <https://www.prio.org/news/3476>. (Accessed on July 22, 2025).

47. Cassandra Clifford. (2011). Poll Ranks Afghanistan the Most Dangerous Country for Women, <https://fpa.org/poll-ranks-afghanistan-the-most-dangerous-country-for-women/>. (Retrieved on 22 July 2025).

subjected this community to persistent degrading and inhumane treatment from the very outset of their rule.

Following the closure of schools by the Taliban, underground and virtual educational institutions, primarily supported by international assistance, most notably from USAID—emerged in Kabul and other regions of Afghanistan. However, after the United States terminated this funding, most of these institutions were forced to close, leaving the girls confined to their homes.⁴⁸

In response to our survey question, *“To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In the past 12 months, the women and girls in my household have had no access to educational or employment opportunities,”*


- Strongly agreed 296 (84%)
- Agreed 40 (11%)
- Somewhat agreed 12 (3%)
- Disagreed 3 (1%)
- Strongly disagreed 4 (1%)

The mean score for this item was 4.7 out of 5, indicating that, in the overwhelming majority of Hazara households, women and girls have been entirely deprived of educational and employment opportunities over the past year.

The distribution is shown in Figure 7

⁴⁸ CNN Instagram Page. (2025, June). *Afghan girls reveal Taliban restrictions on education* [Video]. Instagram. <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMfWJtruYOn/?igsh=M3hxbmFuMTNteXNw>. (Accessed on July 2025).

Figure 7: Degree of agreement concerning the lack of access for girls to employment and educational opportunities over the past 12 months



3.1 Forced and Child Marriage

In November 2021, UNICEF expressed concern over the growing prevalence of child marriage in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power. UNICEF reported, “*We have received credible reports indicating that families are offering girls as young as 20 days old for prospective marriage in exchange for dowries.*” Even before the Taliban’s resurgence, UNICEF partners had documented 183 cases of child marriage and 10 cases of child trafficking in Herat and Badghis provinces. The ages of these children ranged from six months to 17 years. According to UNICEF, 28 percent of women in Afghanistan aged 15 to 49 were married before the age of 18.⁴⁹

A survey conducted in June 2023 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Women, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that 99 percent of respondents reported that the restrictions imposed by the Taliban have contributed to an increase in child labor, child marriage, and internal displacement.⁵⁰

⁴⁹UNICEF. (2021). Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/girls-increasingly-risk-child-marriage-afghanistan>. (Accessed on July 30, 2025).


⁵⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Women, and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). *Situation of Afghan Women*. June 2023. Available at: <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11071/files/inline-files/situation-of-afghan-women-june-2023-dari.pdf> (Accessed: 30 June 2025).

Findings from the current study also indicate a mean score of 3.8 out of 5 for the prevalence of forced marriage, suggesting that most Hazara respondents believe such marriages have increased over the past year. In response to the question, *“To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Girls in my family and community have been coerced into marriage as a result of Taliban governance?”*

- Strongly agreed 145 (41%)
- Agreed 75 (21%)
- Somewhat agreed 89 (25 %)
- Disagreed 35 (10%)
- Strongly disagreed 11(3%)

The distribution is shown in Figure 8

Figure 8: Degree of agreement regarding the increase in forced marriages of girls attributable to Taliban governance



3.2 Extrajudicial Detention and Disappearance of Hazara Females by the Taliban

The Taliban's repression of women and girls of Afghanistan has extended far beyond the promulgation of draconian decrees. They have systematically engaged in arbitrary arrest and abduction of girls under various pretexts. From the first days of their return to power, numerous women and girls have been detained, some remaining in custody to date, while others have been released only upon the payment of financial guarantees by their families.

In 2024, the Taliban arrested women in Afghanistan for alleged violations of dress codes (*Hijab*), and by July 2025, these detentions had become increasingly violent. Richard Bennett, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, expressed deep concern over the continuation and intensification of such arrests, describing them this year as "more violent" than in previous periods. In a statement on the social media platform X, Bennett observed: "These arrests reflect persistent enforcement of the Taliban's systematic gender persecution, causing great fear among Afghans,"⁵¹

Since the Taliban's return to power, Dasht-e-Barchi has been a focal point of grave abuses targeting Hazara women and girls. This Kabul neighborhood, home to the largest concentration of the Hazara population, has witnessed repeated acts of violence and repression. Numerous young women, including Alia Azizi, the former director of Herat's women's prison who disappeared in the first weeks of the Taliban's takeover, have been detained on unfounded charges and transferred to undisclosed locations. Four years into Taliban rule, no information has emerged regarding the fate of those abducted during the early days of their governance. Out of fear of Taliban reprisals, the bereaved families of these women have remained silent. The

⁵¹ KabulNow. (2025, July 22). *UN Special Rapporteur warns Taliban arrests of women and girls becoming more violent*. <https://kabulnow.com/2025/07/un-special-rapporteur-warns-taliban-arrests-of-women-and-girls-becoming-more-violent/> (Accessed July 30, 2025). Also, ABC News. (2025, July 21). *UN concerned by Taliban's arrest of women and girls for dress code violations*. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/concerned-talibans-arrest-afghan-women-girls-dress-code-123919718> (Accessed July 30, 2025)

Bolaq Analysts Network succeeded in interviewing one such family, who recounted the abduction of their daughter, a university student, by the Taliban as follows:

“My sister, Shukria, and I rented a room near the Dasht-e-Barchi’s Tank-e- Tel bus station area, while our family lived in Bamiyan province. I was working, and she, a young woman, was a university student in Kabul. After the Taliban returned to power, they said healthcare workers could keep their jobs. I didn’t trust them, but I went to my office to take my laptop and sensitive documents, fearing they might get into my work records. By then, they had already stopped girls from going to school and university, despite saying at first that women could study. My sister was too afraid to attend classes.

On that dark day, one I will never forget, she stayed home while I was gone for three hours. We planned to leave the next day to see our family. When I came back, our door was open. I saw drops of blood on the stairwell near the shoe cabinet. I ran to our room and found her computer and phone smashed on the floor. She was gone. I rushed outside, but there was no trace of her. I quickly put on a large headscarf and a black mask and searched hospitals, but found nothing. I told no one, not even our neighbors, out of fear.

The next day, I called my brother in another province and told him she was missing, asking him not to tell our elderly parents. He came to Kabul, and for 25 days we searched everywhere. The first place we went was the local police station, where a few Hazara men still worked. They told us, ‘The Taliban took her. There is nothing you or we can do. Stay silent and tell no one.’ To this day, we have found no trace of her.

After a month, our parents kept asking to speak to her by phone. We finally told them she had been missing for over a month. My father suffered a stroke upon hearing the news and died shortly after.

This is not only my sister’s story. In those early days, I had an elderly neighbor who was cried every day. One day, she saw my grief and asked why I was upset. I told her my sister had been missing for four days. She whispered through tears, ‘Silence... my daughter was taken a week ago.’ She told me that in our area alone, she knew three families whose daughters had been taken by the Taliban in September 2021 and reportedly killed, though

they had committed no crime. None of us knew whether they were alive or dead. We all stayed silent out of fear, speaking out would only cost us our dignity and bring no justice. Today, hearing again that many girls in Dasht-e-Barchi have been detained by the Taliban, I feel I must share my story, in the hope that it might help prevent others from becoming victims.”

The Bolaq Analysts Network conducted interviews with two young women arrested by the Taliban in July 2025, each recounting her experience as follows:

“Each day, when I think back to that day, it feels as though darkness closes in around me. I cry and promise myself that if such a thing ever happens again, I will never step outside.

It was in the afternoon when I went to the market to buy groceries. I had just purchased what I needed and was walking home when I saw a Taliban ranger vehicle. My heart sank. Terror gripped me, and in an instant, everything began to unravel. One of the bearded men approached and demanded, ‘Why have you not covered your face? Why have you left home without a male guardian? How can you call yourself a Muslim girl if you do not wear the *hijab*?’

I was speechless. What could I possibly say? As I feared, they forced me into a white vehicle. I cried and begged them to let my father come before taking me, but no one listened. In my heart, I hoped that one of the shopkeepers would speak up to stop them, but no one said a word. Everyone stared at me with cold, judgmental eyes.

What terrified me most were the stares from those men, the faint smirks on their faces as they looked at me. In that moment, I hated being a girl. I wished I had been born a boy so I could live with freedom. Being a girl means being vulnerable; you cannot even walk down the street without fear.

They took me to an office that seemed to belong to the *Amr bil Ma’ruf* [‘Virtue Promotion’] department. Many girls were there, all wearing Islamic hijab, calling their families and crying. I called my father too. I knew he would feel humiliated knowing his daughter had been taken by the Taliban, but I had no choice. I told him what had happened.

A man in a white coat sat behind a desk, lecturing us that women should not leave home without a male guardian and warning us never to do so again. They took our names and our fathers' names, writing them down on paper. My father was forced to pay money for my release, and only then did they let me go. Since that day, I have never gone out alone. I live in constant fear that they might arrest me again.”⁵²

Maryam (pseudonym), who witnessed her friend being taken by the Taliban, recounts her story as follows:

“It was twelve-thirty in the afternoon. My friend and I left home together to attend our course. As we did every day, we traveled from the *Tank-e- Tel* bus station to *Qala-e-Naw* by minibus. That day, we hailed a bus and boarded. When we reached Pul-e-Khoshk, the driver came to an abrupt stop. I assumed, as usual, that it might be due to traffic or a passenger trying to board. But this time was different, a group of bearded men in white coats had stopped the vehicle. The moment I saw them, fear took hold of me. I remembered my mother’s warning: “*Do not go outside, or this group will take you.*” One of the men leaned into the bus, scanning the passengers with a piercing gaze. His eyes locked on my friend and me. Another girl sat a little further away. They called out to us, saying, “*Hey, girls, get off.*” My hands began to tremble, and a wave of dread swept through my body. I didn’t want to move. But then a woman, apparently with them, stepped inside the bus. She grabbed my friend’s hand and yanked her out. My friend cried, “*Please don’t take me! I haven’t done anything!*” Her voice grew more desperate with every word. My ears were ringing, and my mind filled with terrifying thoughts: *What if she comes for me next? What if they imprison me? What if the terrible things people whisper about actually happen?* Before I could gather my thoughts, my friend was gone. They had taken her away. Where? I still do not know.”⁵³

The Taliban’s treatment of Hazara women and girls, under the group’s oppressive policies, constitutes a clear case of *intersectional discrimination* rooted in both ethnicity and gender. The detention of Hazara girls solely for differences in belief, religion, dress, or the pursuit of

⁵² Interview with “Khatira” (pseudonym), 18 years old, from Dasht-e-Barchi

⁵³ Interview with “Maryam” (pseudonym), 15 years old, from Dasht-e-Barchi

education not only reflects the severe restrictions imposed on women, but also reveals that Hazara identity itself is deemed sufficient grounds for punishment, humiliation, and unlawful confinement. Such actions, carried out without due legal process and solely at the orders of local commanders or Taliban religious authorities, lack any legal foundation or legitimacy. They have generated widespread psychological trauma and social insecurity within affected families.

The arbitrary arrest of Hazara girls, often under degrading conditions and without notifying their families, demonstrates that the Taliban's aims extend beyond mere social control. These measures are intended to instill fear and dismantle the cultural and educational resilience of the Hazara community, particularly among women and girls. This pattern of conduct represents a clear case of systematic, ethnically motivated misogyny and constitutes a blatant violation of fundamental human rights. It directly endangers these girls' educational, professional, and personal futures, pushing the Hazara community toward enforced silence and social isolation.

3.3 Migratory Crisis and Forced Deportation from Neighboring Countries

Migration: Globally, an estimated 10.9 million people from Afghanistan remain displaced due to conflict, violence, and poverty, with the vast majority either internally displaced or residing in neighboring countries. Afghanistan ranks third worldwide in displaced populations, after Syria and Ukraine.⁵⁴ Iran and Pakistan serve as the principal host countries, with Iran accommodating approximately 3.47 million and Pakistan about 1.75 million Afghans.⁵⁵ Since the Taliban's return to power, migration and displacement have escalated into one of Afghanistan's most urgent crises, affecting all segments of society. The primary drivers of this exodus include insecurity, violence, armed conflict, poverty, the erosion of rights and freedoms, family-related challenges, limited access to essential services such as healthcare and education, an entrenched culture of migration, natural disasters, and environmental degradation.⁵⁶ Among the most vulnerable

⁵⁴ **UNHCR. (2024).** *Afghanistan refugee crisis explained*. UNHCR USA. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/#Challenges> (Retrieved July 22, 2025)

⁵⁵ **UNHCR. (March 2025).** *Afghanistan Situation*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan> (Retrieved July 28, 2025)

⁵⁶ **MMC. (2024).** *Afghans in Pakistan: Drivers, Risks and Access to Assistance*. Mixed Migration Centre. [Afghans in Pakistan: drivers, risks and access to assistance | Mixed Migration Centre](#)

are the Hazara community, who face acute threats to their survival. For them, the inherent right to life and the urgent imperative to escape death constitute some of the most compelling reasons for seeking refuge beyond Afghanistan's borders.

Over the past year, the Hazara people have endured not only a migratory crisis to neighboring countries but also a marked surge in internal displacement within Afghanistan. The first major wave of Hazara displacement occurred during the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan, who forced them from their ancestral lands through systematic land confiscation, heavy taxation, and explicit threats.⁵⁷ What is now unfolding in many Hazara-populated areas closely mirrors these historical practices. Following their return to power, the Taliban, much like Abdur Rahman Khan, began imposing exorbitant taxes on the agricultural yields and livestock of Hazara farmers. Over the past year, this policy, compounded by a severe water shortage and the resulting decline in agricultural productivity, has driven many Hazaras to abandon or sell their land and livestock. One respondent, who sold all his animals and relocated from Waras District in Bamiyan Province to the provincial capital, explained the reason for his migration as follows:

"I once maintained a flock of 40 to 50 sheep each year, with part of my family's living expenses covered through dairy products and the annual sale of the animals. After the Taliban's rise to power, their officials would come each year to collect *ushr*, one sheep, from me. At present, the price of a sheep ranges between 18,000 and 20,000 Afghanis. For a small family like mine, the sale of a single sheep represents our only annual income from livestock. With the *ushr* taken every year, I was eventually forced to sell all my sheep and move to Bamiyan city."⁵⁸

This Hazara man was compelled to liquidate all his assets and seek asylum in Iran due to the Taliban's increased taxation. He legally traveled to Iran with his entire family on a three-month visa. The authorities extended his stay twice, each time for three months, but eventually deported him back to Afghanistan against his will. He notes that he has now returned to Bamiyan but remains uncertain about how to cope with his current circumstances. Similar accounts are


⁵⁷ Sajjadi, Abdul Qayum. (1380 [2001/2002]). *Jame'e-shenasi-ye Siyasi-ye Afghanistan; Qawm, Mazhab va Hokumat*[Political Sociology of Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion, and Government]. First Edition. Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Qom.

⁵⁸ Hazara man, 47 years old, *Markaz-e Bamiyan*

shared by many other Hazaras who, under specific pressures, have been forced into both internal and cross-border migration.

Based on the findings of this study, the average level of agreement with migrating and finding a safe place to live is 3.5 out of 5. According to this average, most respondents are seeking a safe place to live. As shown in the chart below, out of 355 respondents, 273 (76.90%) completely agreed with migrating and finding a safe place to live, 51 (14.40%) agreed, 17 (4.8%) somewhat agreed, 4 (1.1%) completely disagreed, and 10 (2.8%) disagreed.

The distribution is shown in Figure 9



We subsequently inquired about the challenges faced by participants who had migrated in the past year. They cited difficulties such as verbal abuse and humiliation, lack of assistance, homelessness, discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian aid, hunger, severe psychological distress, mistreatment at the Iran–Afghanistan border due to their Hazara ethnicity, fear of forced return, fear of the Taliban, fear of arrest and execution, and denial of access to education.

3.4 Forced Deportation from Iran:

In the past year, the Iranian government announced a plan for the “regularization/return” of two million Afghan migrants. Under this plan, undocumented Afghan migrants residing in Iran were required to leave the country by 6 July 2025 or face forced deportation. Statistics indicate that.

by July 2025, Iran had forcibly deported 1,684,500 Afghan migrants.⁵⁹ Although the Iranian government's plan ostensibly targeted undocumented migrants, our research reveals that its implementation has also affected documented migrants.

Hazaras, due to shared language and religion, constitute the largest proportion of Afghan migrants in Iran, having lived in the country for many years and contributed to its development. Despite this, they have faced violence, oppression, and humiliation at the hands of Iranian police and citizens. In an interview we conducted with one such Hazara migrant in Iran, he described his arrest by the Iranian police, the circumstances of his release, and the conduct of the police as follows:

“My son, despite holding a valid Iranian residence permit, was apprehended by the Iranian authorities. I went to the refugee camp to secure his release. Although he was in possession of his identification documents, he was nonetheless detained. I pleaded for his freedom. We have lived in Iran for 27 years. The authorities informed me that his release would require a payment of six million tomans. I was compelled to pay this sum. Such conduct is both unlawful and unethical.”⁶⁰

Following the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, there has been a pronounced surge in the deportation of Afghan nationals from Iran. In addition to expelling individuals lacking residency documents or whose visas have expired, Iranian authorities have also detained those holding legal residency. Instances of torture have been reported in refugee camps.⁶¹ Several interviewees contend that the underlying motive for the detention of many individuals, despite possessing valid documentation, is police extortion.

One respondent stated, *“I know many individuals who, despite possessing valid residency documents, were detained. All were released only after paying bribes to the Iranian authorities.”*

⁵⁹ UNHCR. (March 2025). *Afghanistan situation*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan> (Retrieved July 28, 2025); Peltier, E., Fassihi, F., & Akbary, Y. (July 16, 2025). *As Iran departs a million Afghans, 'Where do we even go?' The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/16/world/middleeast/iran-deportations-afghanistan.html> (Retrieved July 28, 2025).

⁶⁰ Interview with a 63-year-old Hazara man, Varamin, Tehran, Iran

⁶¹ Interview with a 70-year-old Hazara man, Qarchak, Tehran, Iran

They detain us solely to extort money, holding us in camps and releasing us only upon the payment of 6 or 7 million tomans.”⁶²

Findings from the current study indicate that 107 individuals (30.10%) were deported from Iran, while 77 individuals (21.70%) were deported from Pakistan, as shown in the table below. An additional 171 individuals (48.20%) reported no experience of deportation.

Table 1: Forced Deportations from Iran and Pakistan

Country	Frequency	Percentage
Iran	107	30.10%
Pakistan	77	21.70%
Neither	171	48.20%
Total	355	100%

⁶² Interview with a 63-year-old Hazara man, Varamin, Tehran, Iran

Chapter Four: Economic Situation

4.1 Livelihood Crisis of the Hazaras under Taliban Rule

With the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, the Hazara community has faced greater poverty than before. The Taliban's discriminatory policies—deliberately excluding Hazaras from employment opportunities, humanitarian aid, and economic activity—have forced many Hazara families into severe livelihood crises. In addition, the suspension of international cooperation, the halt of development projects, and the lack of support programs have worsened the economic situation of this community, placing them in conditions of systematic deprivation.


According to findings from the Bolaq Analysts Network, the Hazaras are facing severe economic difficulties under Taliban rule. The network asked respondents to rate whether their economic conditions had improved in the past year. The following statistics show that:

Average score: 1.7 out of 5 – indicates no improvement in economic conditions.

- Strongly disagree: 198 (55.8%)
- Disagree: 94 (26.5%)
- Somewhat agree: 35 (9.9%)
- Agree: 7 (2.0%)
- Strongly agree: 20 (5.6%)

Overall pattern: Over four-fifths (82.3%) expressed some level of disagreement.

The distribution is shown in Figure 10



Respondents also described their economic situation as very poor as the following statistics show:

Average score: 1.7 out of 5 → indicates respondents generally view their economic situation as very poor.

- Very poor: 185 (52.1%)
- Poor: 107 (30.1%)
- Average: 53 (14.9%)
- Good: 8 (2.3%)
- Excellent: 2 (0.6%)

Overall pattern: Over 82% rated their situation as either “very poor” or “poor.”

The distribution is shown in Figure 11




Table 1: Main source of income of Hazara families based on the responses of 355 interviewees

Source of Income	Frequency	Percentage
A: Government employee	23	6.5%
B: Employee of foreign institutions	10	2.8%
C: Self-employed	219	61.7%
D: Unemployed	103	29%
Total	355	100%

Table 2Table (4): Average monthly income of Hazara families based on the responses of 355 interviewees

Monthly Income	Frequency	Percentage
A: Less than 5,000 Afghanis	157	44.2%
B: 5,000 – 10,000 Afghanis	94	26.5%
C: 10,000 – 20,000 Afghanis	34	9.6%
D: More than 20,000 Afghanis	15	4.2%
E: Prefer not to answer	54	15.2%
Total	355	100%

4.2 Ethnic Discrimination and Economic Deprivation

The Taliban’s ethnic discrimination against the Hazaras is one of the clearest manifestations of systematic repression in Afghanistan under their rule. Operating on a political, military, and administrative structure rooted in Pashtun ethnic supremacy, the Taliban marginalize Hazaras based on religious, ethnic, and historical grounds. From removing them from government positions and restricting their access to education and healthcare, to targeted attacks, arbitrary arrests, and forced displacement—the evidence points to a deliberate and organized policy of marginalization.


This structural discrimination threatens not only the collective identity of the Hazaras but also the national unity and coexistence of Afghanistan. Hazaras experience this discrimination in all aspects of their daily lives under Taliban rule. Regarding access to services, interviewees reported high levels of bias in favor of non-Hazara citizens in government offices. This is indicated as follows:

Average score: 4.3 out of 5 → indicates widespread observation of such favoritism.

- Very often: 234 (65.9%)
- Often: 59 (16.6%)
- Sometimes: 36 (10.1%)
- Rarely: 15 (4.2%)
- Almost never: 11 (3.1%)

Overall pattern: Over 82% reported witnessing it “very often” or “often.”

The distribution is shown in Figure 12.



The nature of power and politics is to monopolize and seize all resources in a country. Such tendencies can only be restrained by law and ethics. In today’s Afghanistan—where the rulers adhere to neither international laws nor moral principles—this monopolistic aspect of power manifests more intensely, as shown in both the Taliban’s history and their current behavior.

As a result, economic infrastructure is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Taliban or their associates, while ordinary citizens face worsening conditions. Economic stagnation, heavy and arbitrary taxes, and restricted market circulation further limit opportunities for ordinary people. For Hazaras, these hardships are multiplied due to targeted discriminatory policies.

Richard Bennett, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, highlighted on November 1, 2024, before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Taliban's systemic discrimination and marginalization of Hazaras in all aspects of life.⁶³ This is not new—Hazaras have faced decades of ethnic and religious discrimination, including the ongoing genocide since the era of Abdur Rahman Khan, halted infrastructure projects in Hazara areas (e.g., the Gardan Deewar road project), and the rerouting of the 500-kilovolt TUTAP power project during the Republic era. Under the Taliban's renewed rule, conditions have only deteriorated.⁶⁴

4.3 Agriculture and Husbandry

The foundation and backbone of the Hazara economy is agriculture and animal husbandry, which have been severely damaged and plunged into crisis since the Taliban came to power for two main reasons:

First, the water supply in Hazarajat is entirely seasonal, with abundant water in spring and early summer, but extreme water shortages occur in late summer and autumn. The lack of standard irrigation dams, coupled with recent droughts, has caused irreparable damage to the agriculture and livestock sectors that form the core of the Hazara economy.

Second, with the rise of the Taliban, armed Kuchis mostly enter Hazarajat in the spring, destroying people's crops and farming, harassing the locals, ruining their livelihoods, and grazing their livestock on the locals' grasslands or pastures.⁶⁵ In some areas, such as Behsud district of Maidan Wardak province and Nawur district of Ghazni province, Kuchis have looted movable property from houses and destroyed immovable property and homes as much as

⁶³ Hasht-e Subh. (2024, September 28). *Transfer of ownership from locals to Kuchis; The Taliban's decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination*. <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>

⁶⁴ UN Web TV. (2024, November 1). *Third Committee, 38th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 79th session*. <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k19/k19trip0lr>

Etilaat Roz. (2024, November 2). *Richard Bennett: Hazaras face violence from ISIS and discrimination from the Taliban*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/214045/ريچارډ-ډبنټ-هزاره-ها-با-خشونت/>

⁶⁵ Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, May 26). *Kuchis injured eight local residents in Behsud*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15399/>

Hasht-e Subh. (2024, September 28). *Transfer of ownership from locals to Kuchis; The Taliban's decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination*. <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>

Etilaat Roz. (2025, May 13). *Kuchis in Nawur, Ghazni have beaten up a number of local residents*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/230484/sources-nomads-have-beaten-up-a-number-of-local-residents-in-naver-ghazni/>

possible. If local people resist, the Kuchis fight them and physically assault them. They also destroy the fodder that people try to store for their livestock in winter and then leave the area in autumn.

For example, in Daraz Qol Punjab, when the Kuchis entered the area, they tried to destroy crops and feedstuff for the locals' animals in winter. After clashing with the locals and being forced to leave, on their way back, they fed their herds with the collected fodder of the locals, and for whatever the herds could not consume, the Kuchis crushed and destroyed it so it could no longer be gathered. In Daraz Qol, there may not be a family whose at least seventy bundles of grass were not destroyed.⁶⁶ Besides trampling and grazing, they also cut off irrigation water so that the locals' crops would dry up and perish due to lack of water. One example is the Mehr area in Punjab district of Bamyan province, which has been mentioned in the report titled "The bullying and extortion of the Taliban in Hazara-inhabited areas."

According to Jadeh Abrisham (Silk Road) report: "A resident of Miramor district in Daikundi says that in addition to destroying the locals' crops and pastures, the Kuchis also extort material from them. According to this Daikundi resident, some Kuchi women collect flour, wheat, and almonds from locals. If their demands are not met, they insult and harass the people. Kuchi women and children tell villagers that the era of the Hazaras is over, and if they don't give them what they want, they will bring the Taliban against them."⁶⁷

A. Ushr (Tithe):

Another tax burden placed on peasants and farmers by the Taliban under a religious guise is called Ushr, which means taking one-tenth of the revenue. After the Kuchis destroy and ruin the crops and agriculture, the Taliban impose this additional tax. Whether there is any harvest left or not, farmers must set aside one-tenth as the Taliban's share and deliver it to them.

In reality, collecting Ushr is one of the main tools of pressure, oppression, and suppression of the Hazaras by the Taliban. According to Jadeh Abrisham's research, a farmer from Lal and Sarjangal says: "They take Ushr from everything; for example, they, without any reduction take Ushr on potatoes, wheat, and animal fodder." This farmer says the Taliban take one sheep or

⁶⁶ Interview with the local residents and victims

⁶⁷ Jadeh Abrisham. (2024, October 17). *Sucking the blood of the people; A report on the harassment of Hazaras by the Taliban*. <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/14260/>

5,000 Afghanis in cash for every 40 sheep. Another farmer in Sarjanganal states the Taliban collect 5,000 Afghanis for 100 seers (700 kg) of wheat and 6,000 Afghanis for 20 gonz of fodder.⁶⁸ Sometimes, even before the harvest, based on inaccurate intelligence about the “seeded” farmland, the Taliban collect Ushr from farmers.

A farmer in Lal and Sarjanganal who planted potatoes says: “One day Taliban members came to my house and demanded Ushr on potatoes. I told them I have not yet harvested my potatoes. The Taliban said they heard you planted 100 seers (700 kg) of seed underground, your potato yield will be 1,000 seers (7000 kg), and you must pay 5,000 Afghanis as Ushr.

It doesn’t matter whether the land was spared from Kuchi destruction and yielded the expected harvest or if the Kuchis destroyed it — farmers must pay the same amount to the Ushr collectors. On the other hand, this additional tax (Ushr) has no clear criteria, and the Ushr collection team, consisting of a few soldiers and officials, take whatever they want from the people.

For example, based on the same Jadeh Abrisham report, the Taliban demanded 5,000 Afghanis⁶⁹ Ushr for 1,000 (7000 kg) seers of potatoes in one place. In another part of the same district, mentioned under “The bullying and extortion of the Taliban in Hazara areas,” one farmer was charged 6,000 Afghanis Ushr for 600 seers (4200 kg) of potatoes, and another was charged 16,000 Afghanis for the same amount.⁷⁰

They have also taken Ushr from WFP aid, as a resident of Lal told Jadeh Abrisham: “A few days ago, I personally witnessed that in Asadabad village, they collected 300 Afghanis from every household, on the pretext that you are receiving help from WFP.”⁷¹

B. Dismissal of Academic Staff and Government Employees

After agriculture, another sector that plays an important role in the livelihood and economy of the Hazaras is university professors and government employees. In recent years, the Hazaras, through hard work and effort, had attained high academic and educational positions and were employed as academic staff in most civilian and military universities. After the fall and collapse

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Jadeh Abrisham. (2024, October 17). *Sucking the blood of the people; A report on the harassment of Hazaras by the Taliban*. <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/14260/>

of the Republic, the Hazaras faced systematic removal from all institutions, especially universities. At first, the Taliban seized control of the leadership councils and the academic-administrative boards of the universities, and through them, removed Hazaras from academic and administrative positions in various ways or transferred/exiled them to distant provinces.

For example, on December 2 (11 Qaws), the Taliban transferred five professors from Bamiyan University to the higher education institutions of Paktika and Logar without any valid reason.⁷² Similarly, others were removed from their academic and administrative positions under the name of “downsizing” or other pretexts. The vacancies left by the Hazaras were filled in various ways — including “special orders” — with individuals close to the leadership council.⁷³ The Hazaras were only kept in the technical departments of Bamiyan University because there was no one else to replace them.⁷⁴ Those who replaced the dismissed staff had no professional capability or competence, leaving the future of Bamiyan University uncertain and bleak.⁷⁵

Similarly, the Taliban removed Hazara professors from the National Military Academy in two stages: in the first stage, under the name of the downsizing process, on July 3, 2025, they dismissed 10 people; in the second stage, on July 22, 2025, they dismissed 6 more.⁷⁶

In an interview with the Bolaq Analysts Network, two former employees of the National Military Academy described their dismissal stories as follows:

“I had worked in this institution for many years. After seizing power, the Taliban began repeatedly asking questions about where we lived and how many people were in our family. After getting our home addresses, they came in person to check if we actually lived there. There were 16 Hazara Shias employed at the National Military Academy. About a month and a half ago, the Taliban downsized about six of them. The remaining 10 of us were dismissed under the name of ‘evacuation.’ One day, after the official ceremonies ended, they called all of us into the office and told us to hand in our cards and go home. Without saying anything, we gave them our cards

⁷² Etilaat Roz. (2024, December 21). *Systematic removal of Hazaras from Bamiyan University*.

<https://www.etilaatroz.com/217659/حذف-سیستماتیک-هزاره-از-دانشگاه-بام>

⁷³ <https://www.etilaatroz.com/230822/elimination-of-hazara-professors-and-ethnic-engineering/>

⁷⁴ Interview with Bamiyan University professors, & Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, May 26). *Hazaras and the obstacles; An investigative report on the process of recruiting academic staff in Afghan universities* (2). <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15394/>

⁷⁵ Interview with a teachers at Bamiyan University

⁷⁶ Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 27). *Ethnic cleansing at the National Military Academy; Dismissal of 16 Hazara professors by the Taliban*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15667/>

and left. There are no Hazara Shias at the National Military Academy anymore — even a Hazara gardener who had worked there for years was dismissed. Life is now very hard for us. Since our dismissal, the Taliban have been monitoring us, and I see two or three of them around my house every day. The threats are very serious. I am very worried for myself and my family.”⁷⁷

Another professor said in an interview:

“There were rumors about our dismissal, but not this soon. Interestingly, only the Hazara positions in the National Military Academy were downsized in two stages. The day they told me my position had been eliminated, I had no support and no power, since the Taliban are in control, so I said nothing and left the office. I worked there for many years. After my dismissal, it has become very difficult for my family to make a living. Because of my fear of this group, I cannot talk to anyone. I now work as a day laborer to meet my family’s needs.”⁷⁸

The same approach was taken in other institutions as well, where under various pretexts — including downsizing, “purification of ranks,” and “enjoining good” — the Taliban dismissed Hazaras from their jobs, labeling them as “incompetent,” “undesirable,” and “hated individuals.” For example, in the past two months, 23 Hazaras were removed from the administrative staff of Bamiyan’s police command under these labels and were replaced by individuals from other ethnic groups.⁷⁹

According to findings by the Bolaq Analysts Network, the average score for dismissal due to being Hazara is 4.3 out of 5. Based on this average, the majority of Hazaras were dismissed because of their ethnicity. As shown in the data below, out of 355 interviewees:

- **Completely agree:** 216 people (60.8%) — believe they were dismissed due to being Hazara.
- **Agree:** 71 people (20.0%)
- **Somewhat agree:** 34 people (9.6%)
- **Disagree:** 27 people (7.6%)
- **Completely disagree:** 7 people (2.0%)


Overall pattern: More than 90% expressed at least some level of agreement.

⁷⁷ Interview with a former employee of the National Military Academy.

⁷⁸ Interview with a former employee of the National Military Academy.

⁷⁹ Interview with the residents.

The distribution is shown in Figure 13



C. Mines

The clearest ethnic discrimination and deprivation of Hazaras is in the mining contracts located in the center of Hazarajat. These mines are contracted to domestic companies, usually owned by individuals close to Taliban members, as noted in the section "Bullying and Extortion by the Taliban in Hazara Areas." These contracts are made under the direct supervision and involvement of Ghazi Brother, the governor, through the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. During the extraction and transportation of these minerals, Hazaras only suffer from dust, environmental pollution, noise pollution, road destruction, traffic accidents, and more. Meanwhile, the revenues from these mines are used to build roads, hospitals, and dams in other provinces.

For example, on 8 Dalw 1403 Hijri Solar (27 January 2025 Gregorian), the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum signed contracts with domestic companies granting five mineral areas of lead, zinc, and multi-minerals in the Yakawlang district of Bamyan province to private companies for extraction. Among them:

- The lead and zinc mine in the Sargastak area of Yakawlang, Bamiyan, contracted to the "Musa Sultan" company,
- The Pami Kakrak mining area contracted to the "Afghan German" company,
- The Sarsarkhak mining area contracted to the "Gamma Eagle" company.

These companies are supposed to build roads, dams, and hospitals in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Maidan Wardak provinces in exchange for mining these minerals.⁸⁰

Additionally, in another contract dated 24 Dalw 1403 Hijri Solar (12 February 2025 Gregorian), the extraction of the lead and zinc mine in the Asb-Maidan area of Yakawlang district, Bamiyan, was assigned to the "Baloch Muhammad Azizi" company.⁸¹

D. Medicinal Plants

The mountains of most parts of Hazarajat have medicinal plants that grow wild. In recent years, these plants provided a source of income for families. Families would collect these plants from the mountains and sell them to traders, thus earning part of their livelihood. However, this source of income has been taken away by the Taliban this year, who have put it under their monopoly. In some parts of Hazarajat, individuals have been sent to collect these plants. For example, in some areas of the Waras district in Bamiyan province, people were sent to collect "Ilerang," and there have been confrontations with local residents.⁸² In the Malistan district of Ghazni province, "Ilerang Sahara" collection was contracted to some individuals for large sums of money.⁸³ Also, in some areas of Jaghori district in Ghazni province, people were prohibited

⁸⁰ tilaatroz. (2025, January 28). *Transfer of lead and zinc mining areas in Bamiyan in exchange for construction of a road and water dam in Uruzgan and Kandahar.*

<https://www.etilaatroz.com/221044/%d9%88%d8%a7%da%af%d8%b0%d8%a7%d8%b1%db%8c-%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%86%db%8c-%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%88-%d8%ac%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%85%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%af%d8%b1/>

⁸¹ Etilaatroz. (2025, February 12). *The Taliban have assigned the extraction of lead and zinc mines in Asb-Maidan, Bamiyan, to a domestic company.*

<https://www.etilaatroz.com/222433/%d8%b7%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%ae%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%ac-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%86-%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%88-%d8%ac%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a8%d9%85%db%8c%d8%af/>

⁸² Interview with the residents

⁸³ Interview with the residents

from collecting wild hay ("Raf/Hang") for their livestock in winter, and people close to Taliban members were sent to collect "Raf sap" from the region.⁸⁴

4.4 Tourism and Urban Areas:

In terms of livelihood, some urban residents in the center of Bamiyan province relied heavily on tourist sites, where local foods, handicrafts, guesthouses, and ticket sales at the Band-e Amir entrance were important sources of income. However, during Taliban rule, most of these sources have disappeared due to Taliban "Amr bil Ma'ruf" (enjoining good) laws. The main remaining source is ticket sales at the Band-e Amir entrance, which for two years has been controlled by Ghazi, Brother of the governor.⁸⁵

During the Republic era, this gate was auctioned publicly, and the winner, after completing legal steps and paying a rental fee—three million Afghanis in the last year of the Republic—was allowed to sell tickets at Band-e Amir.

At tourist sites like Band-e Amir, permission to provide public services for money—even filling water in a chamber pot at the latrine entrance, for which they charge five to ten Afghanis per pot—has been taken from Hazaras and given to Taliban members or their close associates.⁸⁶

Likewise, night-time city guard duties in Bamiyan, whose tax has also doubled (from 100 Afghanis to 200 Afghanis), are held by Taliban members.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Interview with the residents and eyewitness

⁸⁵ Interview with the residents

⁸⁶ Interview with the residents

⁸⁷ Interview with the people in Bamiyan bazar

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the findings of this research, in the fourth year of Taliban rule, the security, social, and economic situations of the Hazara people have deteriorated drastically. In terms of security, this ethnic group has been the direct target of violence by the Taliban, Kuchis, and other extremist groups. Targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, land grabbing, and forced displacement are among the incidents that have occurred throughout the Hazara-inhabited areas.

From a social and economic perspective, the Taliban have severely undermined the social fabrics of the Hazara community by imposing strict restrictions on Hazara women and girls, including bans on education, unlawful arrests and imprisonment, and enforced disappearances. Discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian aid, particularly concerning returnees from Iran and Pakistan, has intensified inequality. Overall, the Taliban's discriminatory structure has placed the Hazara community in a critical and marginalized position.

The Taliban government has not only failed to ensure justice, security, and welfare for all citizens, but through discriminatory and repressive policies—especially against the Hazara community—they have paved the way for deep humanitarian, social, and economic crises. Continuation of this situation could lead to the gradual destruction of the human, cultural, and economic capacities of this group. Therefore, immediate attention from the international community, human rights organizations, and international institutions is essential to support and document violations of Hazara rights and prevent ethnic cleansing.

Based on the findings of this research, we present the following recommendations to improve the situation of the Hazaras:

5.1 Security Sector

- Create a detailed database of discrimination cases, violence, arbitrary arrests, land grabbing, and other human rights violations against Hazaras.
- Document security violations against Hazaras and submit them to international bodies.

- Request that international institutions (United Nations, International Criminal Court, Human Rights Council) systematically investigate crimes committed against Hazaras as acts of genocide.

5.2 Social Sector

- Strengthen the media capacity of the Hazara community to document and communicate their voices to the world.
- Create special support funds for Hazara returnees from Iran and Pakistan.
- Launch global social media campaigns to raise awareness about the situation of Hazaras under Taliban rule.
- Use artistic, literary, and cultural tools to convey the suffering of the Hazara people to the global public.

5.3 Economic Sector

- Request that international organizations increase humanitarian aid to Hazara-inhabited areas, with independent monitoring to prevent discrimination in distribution.
 - Launch fundraising and investment projects in small businesses through the Hazara diaspora.
 - Mobilize support from Hazara migrants to create financial, educational, and market access networks for local products.
-

Appendices

A: Questionnaire Questions:

1. Gender:
A: Male
B: Female
C: Prefer not to say
2. Age:
A: Under 18
B: 18–25
C: 26–35
D: 36–50
E: Over 50
3. Your current place of residence:
(.....)
4. Your education level:
A: Illiterate
B: Primary–Secondary School
C: University degree (Bachelor's)
D: Higher education (Master's or Doctorate)

B. Security Situation

1. To what extent do you agree with this statement: “Public security in the Hazara-inhabited area where I live has worsened in the past year.”
A – Strongly agree
B – Agree
C – Somewhat agree
D – Disagree
E – Strongly disagree
2. To what extent do you agree: “In the past year, I have considered migrating and finding a safer place to live.”
A – Strongly agree
B – Agree
C – Somewhat agree
D – Disagree
E – Strongly disagree
3. To what extent do you agree: “The Taliban, by appointing their members to government offices, have increased cultural and religious discrimination and psychological insecurity in

my area.”

A – Strongly agree

B – Agree

C – Somewhat agree

D – Disagree

E – Strongly disagree

4. With the appointment of Taliban members to government offices, illegal taxation has increased.

A – Strongly agree

B – Agree

C – Somewhat agree

D – Disagree

E – Strongly disagree

5. If you have personal experiences or information about security threats, Taliban pressure, land grabbing, or discriminatory treatment in your area, please write them here (optional).

C. Social Situation

6. To what extent do you agree: “The girls in my family have had no access to educational or employment opportunities in the past year.”

A – Strongly agree

B – Agree

C – Somewhat agree

D – Disagree

E – Strongly disagree

7. To what extent do you agree: “Girls in my family and area have been forced into marriage because of Taliban rule.”

A – Strongly agree

B – Agree

C – Somewhat agree

D – Disagree

E – Strongly disagree

8. Under Taliban control, access to basic healthcare has become difficult.

A – Strongly agree

B – Agree

C – Somewhat agree

D – Disagree

E – Strongly disagree

9. To what extent do you agree: "I have been dismissed from my job because I am Hazara."
- A – Strongly agree
 - B – Agree
 - C – Somewhat agree
 - D – Disagree
 - E – Strongly disagree
10. I have witnessed preferential treatment given to a non-Hazara fellow citizen over myself when visiting government offices.
- A – Very often
 - B – Often
 - C – Sometimes
 - D – Rarely
 - E – Very rarely
11. To what extent do you agree: "In the past year, I have been forced into internal displacement or forced migration."
- A – Strongly agree
 - B – Agree
 - C – Somewhat agree
 - D – Disagree
 - E – Strongly disagree
12. My family and I have experienced forced migration from one of the following countries in the past year:
- A – Iran
 - B – Pakistan
 - C – None
13. If yes, what problems have you experienced?
- A – Violence at the border
 - B – Lack of shelter
 - C – Failure to receive aid
 - D – Discrimination in aid distribution

D. Economic Situation

14. How would you describe your family's current economic situation?
- A – Very poor
 - B – Poor
 - C – Average
 - D – Good
 - E – Excellent

15. To what extent do you agree: "Compared to last year, my family's economic situation has improved."
- A – Strongly agree
 - B – Agree
 - C – Somewhat agree
 - D – Disagree
 - E – Strongly disagree
16. To what extent do you agree: "Economic resources and projects have been fairly distributed in my area."
- A – Strongly agree
 - B – Agree
 - C – Somewhat agree
 - D – Disagree
 - E – Strongly disagree
17. What is your family's average monthly income?
- A – Less than 5,000 Afghani
 - B – 5,000 to 10,000 Afghani
 - C – 10,000 to 20,000 Afghani
 - D – More than 20,000 Afghani
 - E – Prefer not to say
18. What is your family's main source of income?
- A – Government employee
 - B – Employee of foreign institutions
 - C – Self-employed
 - D – Unemployed
-

References

- ABC News. (2025, July 21). *UN concerned by Taliban's arrest of Afghan women and girls for dress code violations*. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/concerned-talibans-arrest-afghan-women-girls-dress-code-123919718>
- Afghanistan International. (2025, January). *Conflicting reports emerge about death of activist & former Taliban prisoner*. <https://www.afintl.com/en/202501205286>
- *Afghanistan: Humanitarian update, March 2025*. United Nations. Retrieved July 28, 2025, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-march-2025>
- Ahmadi, & Jafari. (2025). *Psychological impact of Taliban's religious police on female students in Bamyān City: A study from 2021–2024* (p. 10). Bolaq Analysts Network. <http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26803.13607>
- Australian National University. (2024, February). *The forecast*. <https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/research/projects/atrocity-forecasting/forecasts>
- CIA. (2000). *The World Factbook 2000 — Afghanistan*. Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/2000/afghanistan.html>
- Elian Peltier, Farnaz Fassihi, & Yaqoob Akbary. (2025, July 16). *As Iran departs a million Afghans, 'Where do we even go?'* The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com>
- Etilaat Roz (8am Daily). (2024, September 28). *Transfer of indigenous people's property to Kuchis; The Taliban's decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination*. <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>
- Etilaat Roz (8am Daily). (2025, September 2). *Forced displacement of dozens of families in Ghazni; The Taliban handed over the land of the inhabitants of three villages to the Kuchis*. <https://8am.media/fa/forced-migration-of-dozens-of-families-in-ghazni-the-taliban-handed-over-the-land-of-the-inhabitants-of-three-villages-to-the-nomads/>
- Etilaat Roz. (2024, August 27). *Kuchis in Behsud received compensation from local residents for the burning of their vehicle*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/209299/اكوچيها-در-بهسود-بهخاطر-سوختن-موتورش>
- Etilaat Roz. (2024, December 21). *Systematic removal of Hazaras from Bamyān University*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/217659/حذف-سيستماتيک-هزاره-ها-از-دانشگاه-بام>
- Etilaat Roz. (2024, November 2). *Richard Bennett: Hazaras face violence from ISIS and discrimination from the Taliban*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/214045/اړيچار-د-بنت-هزاره-ها-ب-خشونت>
- Etilaat Roz. (2025, July 29). *A new phase of land occupation and forced displacement*. <https://storage.googleapis.com/qurium/www.etilaatroz.com/236754-forced-displacement-in-afghanistan.html>
- Etilaat Roz. (2025, March 13). *Extortion; to preserve the last piece of ancestral land* [Video]. <https://youtu.be/YUpjG0AwgyQ?si=44P1Lu8ihpEFv0jS>
- Etilaat Roz. (2025, March 30). *Difference in Eid day; Taliban in Malistan, Ghazni "forcibly" made Shiites eat bread and water*. <https://www.etilaatroz.com/226629/مالستان-غزنی-روزه>

- Etilaat Roz. (2025, May 13). *Kuchis in Nawur, Ghazni have beaten up a number of local residents.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/230484/sources-nomads-have-beaten-up-a-number-of-local-residents-in-naver-ghazni/>
- Etilaat Roz. (2025, May 17). *Bamyan University; Elimination of Hazara professors and ethnic engineering.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/230822/elimination-of-hazara-professors-and-ethnic-engineering/>
- Etilaatroz. (2025, February 12). *The Taliban have assigned the extraction of lead and zinc mines in Asb-Maidan, Bamyan, to a domestic company.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/222433/%d8%b7%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%ae%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%ac-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%86-%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%88-%d8%ac%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a8%d9%85%db%8c%d8%af/>
- Etilaatroz. (2025, January 28). *Transfer of lead and zinc mining areas in Bamyan in exchange for construction of a road and water dam in Uruzgan and Kandahar.* <https://www.etilaatroz.com/221044/%d9%88%d8%a7%da%af%d8%b0%d8%a7%d8%b1%db%8c-%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%af%d9%86%db%8c-%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%88-%d8%ac%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%85%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%af%d8%b1/>
- George Washington University. (2022). *The risks facing Hazaras in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.* <https://extremism.gwu.edu/risks-facing-hazaras-in-taliban-ruled-afghanistan>
- Hasht-e Subh. (2024, September 28). *Transfer of ownership from locals to Kuchis; The Taliban's decisions are based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination.* <https://8am.media/fa/transfer-of-ownership-from-bumiha-to-kochiha-the-talibans-decisions-are-based-on-ethnic-and-linguistic-discrimination/>
- Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Ashkar Abad Village, Daikundi Ashkar Abad Sharistan.* <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/>
- Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Kotal-e-Qrewdal, Daikundi.* <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/kotal-e-qrewdal-daikundi/>
- Hazara Genocide Archive. (2025). *Mujtaba Naqavi project.* <https://www.hazaragenocide.com/project/mujtaba-naqavi/>
- International Organization for Migration, UN Women, & United Nations Assistance Mission. (2023, June). *Situation of Afghan women.* <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11071/files/inline-files/situation-of-afghan-women-june-2023-dari.pdf>
- Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, May 26). *Hazaras and the obstacles; An investigative report on the process of recruiting academic staff in Afghan universities (2).* <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15394/>
- Introduction:
- Jadeh Abrisham. (2024, October 17). *Sucking the blood of the people; A report on the harassment of Hazaras by the Taliban.* <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/14260/>
- Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 13). *The Taliban have ordered the evacuation of Rashak Village in Bamyan Province.* <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/15499/>

- Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 27). *Ethnic cleansing at the National Military Academy; Dismissal of 16 Hazara professors by the Taliban*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15667/>
- Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, July 6). *Three residents of Punjab District, Bamyān Province, were beaten by armed Kuchis*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15466/>
- Jadeh Abrisham. (2025, May 26). *Kuchis injured eight local residents in Behsud*. <https://jade-abresham.com/reports/15399/>
- KabulNow. (2025, July 22). *UN Special Rapporteur warns Taliban arrests of women and girls becoming more violent*. <https://kabulnow.com/2025/07/un-special-rapporteur-warns-taliban-arrests-of-women-and-girls-becoming-more-violent/>
- Mixed Migration Centre [MMC]. (2024). *Afghans in Pakistan: Drivers, risks and access to assistance*. <https://mixedmigration.org>
- NSIA. (2024). *Estimated population of Afghanistan 2024–25* (p. II). National Statistics and Information Authority. <https://nsia.gov.af:8443/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B3-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-1403.pdf>
- Oxus. (2025, July 29). *Forced displacement and land grab; The Taliban gave a Hazara village in Bamyān to Pashtun nomads*. <https://oxus.tv/2025/07/29/forced-displacement-and-land-grab-taliban-give-a-hazara-village-in-bamyan-to-pashtun-nomads/>
- PRIO. (2023, October). *Afghanistan ranks bottom of global index on women's status*. <https://www.prio.org/news/3476>
- Sajadi, A. Q. (2001). *Political sociology of Afghanistan: Ethnicity, religion, and government* (1st ed.). Qom: Bustan-e-Ketab Qom.
- Silk Road. (2025, June 27). *Kuchi invasion of Nahur, Ghazni; How was Mohammad Latif Qurbani killed?* <https://jade-abresham.com/slideshow/15462/>
- Tolo News. (2025). *Waziristan refugees to be relocated in north, south, center: Mujahid*. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-183754?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- UN Web TV. (2024, November 1). *Third Committee, 38th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 79th session*. <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k19/k19trip0lr>
- UNESCO. (n.d.). *Community-based literacy and complementary learning possibilities*. UNESCO Kabul Field Office. <https://www.unesco.org/en/fieldoffice/kabul/expertise/education/literacy-learning-possibilities>
- UNHCR. (2024). *Afghanistan refugee crisis explained*. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/#Challenges>
- UNHCR. (2025, March). *Afghanistan situation*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan>
- UNHCR. (n.d.). *Afghanistan situation*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan>
- UNICEF. (2021). *Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan*. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/girls-increasingly-risk-child-marriage-afghanistan>
- United Nations Development Programme

- United Nations Development Programme. (2025, April). *Afghanistan socio-economic review: Fragile gains, deepening subsistence insecurity, 2023–2024* (p. 50).
- United Nations Human Rights Council. (2025). *Access to justice and protection for women and girls and the impact of multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination* (A/HRC/59/25). United Nations. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5925-access-justice-and-protection-women-and-girls-and-impact>